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ABSTRACT	  
After	   initiating	   the	   economic	   reform	   in	   1978	   and	   the	   subsequent	   political	  decentralization,	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  largely	  lost	  its	  political	  control	  in	  rural	  areas.	  To	  regain	  the	  power,	  senior	  leaders	  of	  CCP	  decided	  to	  introduce	  local	  elections	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  rebuild	  the	  legitimacy.	  After	  enforced	  all	  over	  the	  country,	  village	  elections	  did	  help	  ameliorate	   the	   local	  governance	  and	  prompt	  the	   provision	   of	   public	   goods.	  However,	   the	   unclear	   stipulation	   in	   the	  Organic	  
Law	  of	  Village	  Elections	  simultaneously	  resulted	  in	  some	  institutional	  outcomes,	  leading	   to	   a	  power-­‐sharing	  puzzle	  between	   local	   party	  branch	   and	   the	   elected	  village	  committee.	  Using	  the	  local	  public	  policy	  as	  an	  indicator,	  I	  will	  develop	  a	  formal	  model	   in	   this	   paper	   to	   explain	   this	   puzzle	   and	   argue	   that	  when	   facing	  unpopular	  policies,	  conflicts	  between	  local	  party	  secretary	  and	  village	  chief	  is	  in	  equilibrium.	   To	   maintain	   the	   stability	   in	   rural	   areas,	   government	   leaders	   in	  different	  provinces	  have	  put	  forward	  various	  solutions	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  conflict,	  including	   a	   political	   experiment,	   which	   was	   called	   “Qingxian	   Model”	   later,	  conducted	   in	   Qing	   County	   of	   Hebei	   Province.	   I	   argue	   in	   this	   paper	   that	   by	  resurrecting	   the	   Villager	   Representative	   Assembly,	   this	   political	   reform	  essentially	   reconcentrates	   the	   power	   on	   the	   party	   branch	   and	   sabotages	   the	  local	  democracy	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	   Key	  Words:	  Chinese	  Village	  Election	   	   Power-­‐Sharing	  Puzzle	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Chapter	  One:	  Introduction	  
Accompanied	   with	   the	   high-­‐speed	   economic	   growth	   and	   the	   continuously	  loose	  control	  of	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	   (CCP)	   in	   rural	  China,	  mass	   incidents	  came	   out	   all	   over	   the	   country	   from	   time	   to	   time,	   among	   which	   the	   “Wukan	  Incident”,	  or	  “Siege	  of	  Wukan”,	  drew	  a	  lot	  of	  attention.	  Began	  in	  September	  2011,	  thousand	   villagers	   from	   Wukan	   Village,	   located	   in	   Guangdong	   Province,	  protested	   in	   front	   of	   the	   municipal	   government	   building	   and	   police	   office	   to	  express	   their	   indignation	   against	   the	   village	   leaders’	   corruptions.	   This	   protest	  soon	  evolved	   into	  a	  severe	  crash	  between	   the	  police	  and	  protesters	  and	   finally	  resulted	   in	   a	   month-­‐long	   confrontation.	   Simultaneously,	   incumbent	   village	  leaders	  were	  ousted	  out	  of	   village.	   In	  February	  2012,	   according	   to	   the	  Organic	  Law	  of	  Village	  Committee,	  villagers	  in	  Wukan	  successively	  reelected	  members	  of	  Village	   Election	   Committee,	   Village	   Representative	   Assembly,	   and	   Village	  Committee	   in	  a	  completely	   free	  and	  competitive	  way.	  After	   that,	  elected	  village	  cadres	   continued	   appealing	   to	   the	   higher-­‐level	   government	   until	   finally	   their	  requirements	  were	  accepted	  and	  former	  villager	  leaders	  were	  put	  in	  jail.	  Despite	  the	  protest	  details	  of	  this	  incident,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  villagers	  in	  Wukan	  village	   can	   automatically	   conduct	   the	   village	   election	   well	   based	   on	   the	   legal	  provision	   even	   without	   any	   supervision	   from	   above,	   proving	   that	   after	   near	  thirty	  years’	  development,	  the	  experiment	  of	  village	  self-­‐governance	  in	  China	  has	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generated	   a	   solid	   bass	   of	   support	   and	   earned	  widespread	   recognition	   of	   local	  villagers.	   	  Following	  the	  economic	  reforms	  initiated	  in	  China	  since	  1978,	  the	  communal	  system	   and	   collectivization	   policies,	   originally	   serving	   as	   tools	   to	   control	   rural	  areas,	   collapsed	   gradually.	   Instead,	   family	   per	   se	   became	   the	   main	   unit	   of	  production,	   making	   villagers	   less	   dependent	   on	   the	   state.	   Besides,	   as	   the	  decision-­‐making	   process	   largely	   decentralized,	   local	   cadres	   achieved	   greater	  discretion	   in	   determining	   local	   affairs,	   which	   made	   the	   central	   government	  harder	  to	  exert	  effective	  monitor	  on	  local	  cadres.	  Consequently,	  corruption	  and	  speculation	   were	   rampant	   over	   local	   areas,	   which	   stimulated	   villagers’	   great	  dissatisfaction.	   In	   this	   context,	   public	   policies,	   especially	   some	   unpopular	  policies	   such	  as	  grain	  procurement,	   tax	  collection,	  and	  birth	  control	  were	  even	  harder	  to	  enforce	  in	  villages	  due	  to	  the	  severer	  cadre-­‐villager	  conflict.	  In	   order	   to	   regain	   the	   power	   and	   legitimacy	   in	   rural	   areas,	   Chinese	   senior	  leaders,	  paradoxically	  to	  some	  degree,	  decided	  to	  gradually	  initiate	  the	  political	  reform	   at	   the	   local	   level	   after	   an	   intense	   argument	   between	   liberal	   and	  conservative	   factions.	   By	   endowing	   more	   autonomous	   rights	   to	   villagers	   to	  decide	  their	  own	  business,	  Chinese	  autocrats	  expected	  to	  maintain	  the	  stability	  and	   the	   smooth	   enforcement	   of	   public	   policies,	   especially	   unpopular	   ones.	   In	  1982,	  China	  began	  to	  officially	  exert	  the	  grassroots	  self-­‐governance	  in	  rural	  areas	  across	   the	  whole	   country.	   In	   1988,	   with	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   Organic	   Law	   of	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Village	  Committee,	  villagers	  achieved	  the	  right	  to	  directly	  elect	  their	  government	  officials.	   (China	   Legal	   Publishing	  House,	   2010)	  By	   this	   institutional	   design,	   the	  elected	  village	  committees	  are	  composed	  of	   three	   to	  seven	  members,	   including	  one	   village	   chief,	   with	   a	   three-­‐year	   term	   and	   no	   term	   limits.	   All	   committee	  members	  are	  chosen	  by	  popular	  election,	  in	  which	  all	  adult	  villagers	  who	  satisfy	  the	  requirements	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  and	  be	  voted.	  Regarding	  the	  nomination	  process,	  at	   the	   first	  stage	  of	   the	  reform,	   the	  upper-­‐level	  government	  controlled	  the	   power	   to	   nominate	   candidates.	   In	   1998,	   the	   revised	  Organic	   Law	   removed	  this	  qualification	  so	   that	   the	  provincial	  government	  can	  decide	  specific	  rules	   in	  their	  own	  convenience.	  (Martinez-­‐Bravo	  et	  al	  2011;	  Li	  &	  O’Brien	  1999)	  	   Actually,	   China	   is	   neither	   the	   first,	   nor	   the	   only	   country	   to	   conduct	   this	  partially	   local	  democratization	   in	  the	  world.	  Such	   local	  elections	  also	  existed	   in	  other	   authoritarian	   countries	   such	   as	   India,	   Brazil,	   and	   Indonesia	   previously.	  (Besley	   &	   Burgess	   2002;	   Foster	   &	   Rosenzweig	   2001;	   Olken	   2010).	   Village	  elections	   in	   China	   proved	   to	   be	   effective	   in	   monitoring	   village	   leaders’	  governance	  and	  prompting	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods.	  Besides,	  proponents	  of	  this	  political	  reform	  also	  expect	  it	  to	  be	  the	  first	  step	  of	  further	  democratization,	  though	  until	  now	  there	  is	  still	  no	  clear	  sign	  of	  expansion	  of	  local	  democracy	  to	  a	  higher-­‐level	  government.	   	  	   Despite	   the	   contributions	   that	   Chinese	   village	   elections	   have	   made	   to	   the	  local	   governance	   and	   stability,	   problems	   also	   came	   out,	   among	   which	   the	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power-­‐sharing	   puzzle	   between	   the	   local	   party	   branch	   and	   the	   elected	   village	  committee	   is	   the	  most	   prominent	   one	   as	   there	   is	   no	   clear	   stipulations	   in	   legal	  provisions	   related	   to	   their	   power	   demarcation.	   According	   to	   the	   Regulation	   of	  CCP’s	  Organization	  Work	  in	  Rural	  Area,	  the	  main	  responsibility	  of	  a	  party	  branch	  in	   village	   is	   to	  discuss	   and	  decide	   “important	   issues”	   related	   to	   local	   economic	  and	  social	  development	  (Zhongguofangzheng	  Press,	  2004);	  While	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Organic	   Law	  of	  Village	  Committee,	   “big	   issues”	   in	   village	   should	  be	  decided	  by	  autonomous	   organizations	   such	   as	   village	   committee,	   village	   assembly,	   and	  village	   representative	   assembly.	   In	   this	   sense,	   both	   organizations	   possess	  paralleled	  de	   jure	  power	  since	   it	   is	  hard	  to	  differentiate	  “important	   issues”	  and	  “big	   issues”	   in	   small	   villages.	   (Guo,	   2001)	   However,	   this	   de	   jure	   power	   is	  endowed	   by	   different	   authorities.	   Based	   on	   a	   Leninist	   principle	   called	  democratic	   centralism*	   (Chinese	   People’s	   Publishing	   House,	   2012),	   the	   party	  branch	  in	  Chinese	  village	  is	  empowered	  by	  the	  upper-­‐level	  party	  committee.	  The	  elected	  village	  committee,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  empowered	  by	  local	  electorates.	  In	  this	  sense,	   provided	   that	   village	   elections	   are	   competitive	   and	   fair,	   the	   party	  secretary	  will	  follow	  upper-­‐level	  government’s	  mandate,	  but	  village	  chief	  will	  be	  accountable	   to	   villagers.	   Consequently,	   this	   power-­‐sharing	   puzzle	   and	   the	  accountability	   problem	   may	   lead	   to	   conflicts	   between	   village	   chief	   and	   party	  secretary.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Due	  to	  this	  democratic	  centralism,	  once	  a	  new	  policy	  being	  suggested,	  the	  lower-­‐level	  party	  branch	  can	  enjoy	  full	  discussion	  before	  the	  upper-­‐level	  party	  committee	  makes	  the	  final	  decision.	  But	  once	  the	  decision	  is	  made,	  the	  low-­‐level	  party	  branch	  will	  have	  no	  bargain	  space	  but	  fully	  accept	  and	  implement	  the	  policy.	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   Given	  this	  institutional	  deficiency	  on	  Chinese	  local	  governance,	  when	  will	  the	  conflict	  emerge	  between	  village	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary?	  Why	  does	  this	  conflict	  emerge?	  If	  there	  do	  exist	  different	  preferences,	  is	  there	  any	  incentive	  for	  certain	  player	  to	  defect	   for	  an	  agreement?	  In	  this	  paper,	   I	  will	  develop	  a	  pure	  strategic	  model	   to	  explain	   these	  research	  questions.	   I	  argue	   that	  as	   the	  village	  chief	  and	  party	   secretary	   are	   accountable	   to	   different	   authorities,	   they	   may	   possess	  different	   preferences	   towards	   certain	   public	   policies.	   When	   facing	   consistent	  policies,	  towards	  which	  villagers	  and	  upper-­‐level	  government	  possess	  the	  same	  preference,	   both	   party	   secretary	   and	   village	   chief	   will	   prefer	   to	   enforce	   them.	  However,	   when	   dealing	   with	   contentious	   policies,	   towards	   which	   villagers’	  interest	  is	  largely	  deprived	  by	  the	  upper-­‐level	  government,	  while	  party	  secretary	  still	  prefer	   to	  enforce	   them,	  village	  chief,	  on	   the	  contrary,	   tends	   to	   reject	   them.	  Both	  village	   chief	   and	  party	   secretary	  have	  no	   incentive	   to	  defect	   in	   these	   two	  situations	  as	  the	  outcomes	  in	  my	  model	  are	  in	  equilibrium.	   	  	   Regarding	   this	  outcome,	  my	  next	  research	  question	   in	   this	  paper	   is	  how	  to	  deal	   with	   the	   conflict	   between	   village	   chief	   and	   party	   secretary.	   In	   practice,	  government	  leaders	  in	  different	  provinces	  have	  put	  forward	  various	  solutions.	  A	  simple	  solution	  is	  to	  merge	  the	  two	  sets	  personnel	  and	  let	  party	  secretary	  hold	  concurrent	   position	   of	   village	   chief.	   Besides,	   leaders	   of	   Qing	   County	   in	   Hebei	  Province	  designed	  a	  new	  method	  in	  2002	  and	  soon	  spread	  its	  use	  to	  the	  whole	  county.	  This	  political	  experiment	  was	  named	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  later	  by	  Chinese	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scholars.	   To	   probe	   into	   its	   processing	   mechanism	   and	   practical	   outcome,	   I	  conducted	  a	   field	   study	   in	  Qing	  County	   in	  2010	  with	   three	   team	  members.	  We	  found	  that	  by	  resurrecting	  the	  power	  of	  Village	  Representative	  Assembly	  (VRA)	  nominally	  and	  assigning	  the	  party	  secretary	  to	  run	  for	  the	  president	  of	  VRA,	  the	  party	  branch	   in	   village	   regains	   its	   power	  over	   the	   village	   committee.	   Thus,	  we	  concluded	   that	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   the	   “Qingxian	  Model”	  would	   sabotage	   the	   local	  democracy	  in	  China.	  	   In	   the	   following	   paper,	   I	   will	   first	   review	   some	   existing	   research	   works	  related	   to	   Chinese	   village	   elections.	   After	   that,	   I	  will	   lay	   out	   some	   background	  knowledge	   of	   Chinese	   village	   elections	   in	   the	   third	   section,	   and	   then	   elaborate	  the	  formal	  model	  based	  on	  political	  interactions	  between	  village	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary	  regarding	  different	  types	  of	  public	  policies	  in	  Section	  Four.	  In	  Section	  Five,	   I	  will	  discuss	   the	  “Qingxian	  Model”	   in	  detail	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  power-­‐sharing	  puzzle	  between	  village	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary.	  A	  conclusion	  of	  the	  whole	  paper	  will	  come	  at	  the	  end.	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Chapter	  Two:	  Literature	  Review	  
There	   are	   various	   research	   works	   focusing	   on	   China’s	   local	   level	  self-­‐autonomy	   issue	   since	   its	   initiation	   in	   1982,	  most	   of	  which,	   however,	  were	  engaged	  in	  analyzing	  village	  elections,	  which	  were	  seen	  as	  the	  core	  content	  of	  the	  self-­‐governance	  in	  rural	  China.	  Among	  these	  various	  studies,	  three	  questions	  are	  generally	  put	  forward	  and	  explained	  by	  scholars,	  namely	  incentives	  for	  Chinese	  central	  leaders	  to	  initiate	  popular	  elections	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  the	  competitiveness	  and	   fairness	   of	   the	   popular	   elections,	   and	   potential	   outcomes	   of	   such	   village	  elections.	  Regarding	  the	  first	  question,	  scholars	  tend	  to	  explain	  it	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  that	  Chinese	  leaders	  mainly	  treat	  village	  elections	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  regain	  the	  political	  power	  and	  legitimacy	  in	  rural	  areas.	  Based	  on	  abundant	  historical	  documents,	  Li	  and	  O’Brien	   (1999)	   argued	   explicitly	   that	   before	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	  Organic	  Law	  of	  Village	  Committee	  in	  1988,	  contentions	  were	  widespread	  among	  Chinese	  senior	  leaders	  as	  well	  as	  the	  local	  officials.	  While	  the	  opponents	  were	  afraid	  that	  introducing	   local	   elections	   and	   endowing	  more	   autonomous	   rights	   to	  peasants	  may	   exacerbate	   the	   loose	   central-­‐local	   and	   cadre-­‐villager	   relations,	   the	  proponents,	  among	  whom	  two	  senior	  leaders,	  Peng	  Zhen	  and	  Bo	  Yibo	  stood	  out,	  believed	   that	   in	   the	   reform	   era,	   as	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   was	   largely	  decentralized	   to	   local	  officials,	   it	  was	  harder	   to	  monitor	   local	   cadres’	  behavior.	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Besides,	   as	   peasants	   became	   less	   dependent	   on	   the	   state,	   unpopular	   public	  policies	  would	   encounter	  more	   resistance	   from	  below.	   Consequently,	   initiating	  village	  elections	  will	  on	  one	  hand	  transfer	   the	  previously	   imperfect	  monitoring	  job	  to	  vernacular	  villagers,	  thus	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  village	  leadership,	  and	  on	   the	   other	   hand	   mitigate	   the	   severe	   cadre-­‐villager	   relations,	   thus	   making	  unpopular	  policies	  more	  acceptable.	  (O’Brien	  1994,	  Kelliher	  1997,	  Manion	  1996,	  Li	   &	   O’Brien	   2006,	   Tsai	   2007).	   For	   me,	   I	   tend	   to	   agree	   with	   these	   scholars’	  analysis	  that	  virtually	  village	  elections	  just	  served	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  CCP	  to	  rebuild	  the	  support	  in	  rural	  areas.	  In	  terms	  of	  questions	  related	  to	  the	  competitiveness	  and	  fairness	  of	  electoral	  process,	  the	  Carter	  Center,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Ministry	  of	  Civil	  Affairs	  (MCA),	   has	   contributed	   valuable	   research	   documents.	   Starting	   in	   1997,	   the	  Carter	  Center	  has	   sent	   several	   research	  groups	   to	  different	  provinces	   in	  China,	  such	  as	  Yunnan,	  Guangdong,	  Fujian,	  Hebei,	  Hunan,	  and	  Heilongjiang,	  to	  observe	  the	   electoral	   process,	   collective	   data,	   and	   make	   relative	   analyses.	   Their	  observation	  and	  research	  basically	  cover	  the	  whole	  process	  of	  a	  village	  election,	  including	   the	   formulation	   of	   Village	   Election	   Committee	   and	   Village	  Representative	   Assembly,	   the	   primary	   nomination	   and	   the	   final	   election	   of	  candidates,	  the	  ballot	  casting,	  and	  the	  publication	  of	  electoral	  results.	  According	  to	   their	   evaluation	   report,	   there	   is	   a	   significant	   improvement	   in	   the	  standardization	   and	   quality	   of	   village	   elections	  with	   time	   passing.	   (The	   Carter	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Center,	  1998)	  Besides,	  most	  scholars	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  initially	  local	  elections	  are	  uncompetitive,	  which	  was	   reflected	   in	   two	  aspects.	   First,	   based	  on	  original	  electoral	   procedures,	   the	   nomination	   process	   is	   conducted	   by	   the	   upper-­‐level	  government	   rather	   than	   the	   general	   public,	   which	   largely	   weakens	   villagers’	  discretion	  in	  deciding	  their	  leaders.	  (Manion	  1996)	  Second,	  previous	  local	  cadres	  were	  generally	  hostile	  to	  village	  elections	  for	  fear	  of	  losing	  their	  vested	  interests	  unless	  they	  were	  confident	  that	  they	  could	  still	  win	  out	  in	  competitive	  elections.	  To	   maintain	   their	   power,	   local	   cadres	   were	   engaged	   in	   manipulating	   the	  elections,	  either	  offering	  money	   to	  higher-­‐level	  officials	   for	   support,	  or	  directly	  buy	   votes	   from	   villagers.	   (Li	   &	   O’Brien	   1999,	   Wang	   2009).	   However,	   some	  scholars	   point	   out	   that	   the	   competitiveness	   issue	   has	   largely	   been	   solved,	  especially	   after	   the	   revision	   of	   Organic	   Law	   of	   Village	   Committee	   in	   1998,	   in	  which	   the	  nomination	  process	  has	  generally	  opened	   to	  all	  villagers.	  Besides,	  as	  villagers	   became	  more	   familiar	   and	   knowledgeable	   about	   democratic	   settings,	  they	   were	   more	   inclined	   to	   defend	   the	   electoral	   system	   by	   petitioning	   to	   a	  higher-­‐level	   authority	   if	   local	   cadres	   violated	   regulations.	   (O’Brien	   1996,	   Li	   &	  O’Brien	  1995)	  Another	  set	  of	  papers	  move	   further	   to	  explain	  what	   factors	  may	  influence	  the	  competitiveness.	  O’Brien	  and	  Li	  (2000)	  maintained	  that	  relatively	  well	  off	  villages	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  competitive	  elections.	  While	  Shi	  (1999)	  and	  Epstein	   (1997)	   argued	   that	   villages	   with	   average	   wealth	   and	   median	   income	  were	  more	   likely	   to	  hold	  competitive	  elections.	  Besides,	  Oi	  and	  Rozelle	   (2000),	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explained	  that	   it	   is	   the	  source	  of	  outcome,	  village’s	   industrial	  structure	  and	  the	  participation	  of	  villagers	  in	  assemblies	  and	  representative	  assemblies	  that	  jointly	  determine	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  village	  elections.	   	  The	   third	   research	   topic	   focused	   on	   potential	   political	   outcomes	   of	   village	  elections.	   First,	   one	   group	   of	   scholars	   probed	   into	   the	   possibility	   that	   village	  elections	  could	  contribute	   to	   the	  higher-­‐level	  democratization	  (Pei	  1995,	  Wang	  1998,	  Shi	  1999)	  and	   the	  development	  of	  civil	   society	   (Chan,	  1998).	  Besides,	  by	  observing	   the	  experiment	  of	   township	  elections	   in	  several	  provinces,	  Li	   (2002)	  argued	  that	  the	  village	  elections	  might	  help	  initiate	  the	  further	  electoral	  reform,	  and	  the	  widespread	  attention	  from	  international	  community	  may	  press	  the	  local	  government	   to	   improve	   its	   human	   right	   record.	   However,	   some	   scholars	  questioned	   the	   significance	   of	   village	   elections	   and	   argued	   that	   the	   local	  democracy	   can	  only	  make	  peripheral	   contributions	   to	  China’s	  democratization.	  (Louie,	   2001)	  Besides,	   the	   second	   group	   of	   scholars	   focused	  more	   on	  whether	  village	   elections	   can	   prompt	   the	   amelioration	   of	   local	   governance	   and	   the	  accountability	  of	   local	  cadres.	  Manion	  (1994)	  argued	   that	  as	   the	  elected	  village	  chief	  will	  be	  more	  accountable	  to	  the	  villagers,	  state	  involvement	  will	  be	  less	  in	  local	   economy.	   However,	   in	   one	   of	   her	   later	   research	   works,	   Manion	   (1996)	  revised	   her	   argument.	   By	   observing	   the	   villager	   and	   local	   official’s	   attitudes	  towards	   the	   state	   role	   in	   the	   local	   economy,	   she	   argued	   that	   village	   chief	   is	  simultaneously	   accountable	   to	   the	   upper-­‐level	   government	   and	   local	   villagers.	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Tsai	   (2002),	  and	  Brandt	  and	  Turner	   (2007)	  both	  demonstrated	   in	   their	  papers	  that	   openly	   elected	   leaders	  do	   respond	   to	   villager	   complaints	   for	   fear	   of	   being	  voted	  out	  of	  office.	  Mu	  and	  Zhang	  (2011)	  maintained	  that	  village	  chief	  could	  only	  respond	   to	   certain	   groups	   of	   villagers.	   They	   categorize	   China’s	   villages	   into	  natural	   villages	   and	   administrative	   villages*,	   and	   argued	   that	   group	   identity	  influences	  the	  election	  results	  of	  village	  cadres,	  who	  in	  turn	  offers	  more	  targeted	  public	   goods	   to	   their	   own	   natural	   villages.	   Besides,	   they	   also	   maintain	   that	  elected	  village	  chief	  will	   show	   less	   favoritism	   in	   the	  allocations	  of	  public	  goods	  than	   unelected	   secretary,	   who	   tends	   to	   allocate	   more	   resources	   to	   her	   own	  ethnic	   group.	   Alpermann	   (2001)	   began	   to	   discuss	   the	   accountability	   issue	   of	  local	  cadres	  in	  the	  context	  of	  certain	  policies.	  He	  argued	  that	  when	  dealing	  with	  some	   contentious	   policies,	   such	   as	   the	   one-­‐child	   policy	   and	   policies	   related	   to	  local	  economic	  development,	  party	  secretary	  still	  plays	  decisive	  role	  and	  village	  chief	   only	   acts	   as	   the	   “agents”	   of	   the	   party.	   However,	   Kennedy	   et	   al.	   (2004)	  opposed	   this	   argument	  by	  proving	   that	   competitive	   village	   elections	  will	   press	  elected	   leaders	   to	   be	   more	   accountable	   to	   villagers	   when	   making	   local	   land	  policies.	  Martinez-­‐Bravo	  et	   al.	   (2011)’s	  paper	   further	  divided	   the	   state	  policies	  into	  congruent	  and	  incongruent	  policies	  and	  argued	  that	  as	  long	  as	  village	  chiefs	  possess	   certain	  discretion	  over	   the	  decision-­‐making	  of	   these	  policies,	   they	  will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  The	  natural	  villages	  are	  formed	  spontaneously	  and	  naturally	  through	  a	  long	  time,	  mostly	  influenced	  by	  the	  geographic	  characteristics	  and	  living	  patterns;	  while	  the	  administrative	  villages	  are	  created	  by	  CCP	  in	  convenience	  of	  control,	  mostly	  bigger	  than	  the	  natural	  villages	  and	  composed	  by	  several	  adjacent	  natural	  villages.	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tend	  to	  represent	  the	  villagers’	  interest	  in	  both	  popular	  and	  unpopular	  policies.	   	  The	   scholars	   above	   have	   contributed	   valuable	   knowledge	   to	   this	   certain	  research	  field,	  but	  several	  arguments	  need	  to	  be	  further	  discussed	  and	  improved.	  First,	   though	   Chinese	   central	   leaders	   still	   mainly	   focus	   on	   maximizing	   the	  strategic	  effects	  of	   local	  elections,	   i.e.	  to	  maintain	  local	  stability	  and	  prompt	  the	  enforcement	   of	   state	   policies,	   the	   election,	   as	   a	   democratic	   setting,	   will	  spontaneously	   create	   some	   institutional	   effects.	   Given	   that	   village	   elections	  become	  more	  competitive	  and	  widespread	  with	  time	  passing,	  these	  institutional	  effects	  will	   further	   stand	  out.	  Thus	  when	  discussing	  political	   outcomes	  of	   such	  elections,	  we	  should	  not	  simply	  neglect	  the	  institutional	  effects.	  Second,	  previous	  research	  works	  mainly	  focus	  on	  the	  accountability	  issue	  of	  village	  chief,	  while	  the	  role	   party	   secretary	   plays	   in	   local	   affairs	   is	   largely	   ignored.	   Actually,	   party	  branch	   still	   possesses	   paralleled	   de	   jure	   and	   de	   facto	   power	   in	   local	  decision-­‐making	   process,	   and	   nominally,	   party	   secretary	   is	   still	   the	   boss	   and	  “first	   hand”	   (“Yibashou”	   in	   Chinese)	   in	   village.	   (Oi	   &	   Rozelle	   2000,	   Alpermann	  2001)	   Consequently,	   we	   should	   take	   party	   secretary’s	   preference,	   and	   most	  importantly	   the	   interactions	   between	   village	   chief	   and	   party	   secretary,	   into	  consideration.	   Finally,	   we	   must	   avoid	   the	   generalization	   problem	   during	   the	  research.	  As	   the	  Organic	  Law	  of	  Village	  Committee	  only	  provides	   an	  outline	  of	  village	  elections,	  different	  provinces	  can	  formulate	  different	  electoral	  rules	  based	  on	  their	  own	  reality.	  Thus,	  the	  concrete	  interactions	  between	  party	  secretary	  and	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village	   chief	   may	   be	   largely	   influenced	   by	   peculiar	   formal	   and	   informal	  institutions.	   	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   power-­‐sharing	   puzzle	   between	   village	   chief	   and	   party	  secretary,	   though	   some	   scholars	   have	   mentioned	   this	   problem,	   few	   conduct	  deeper	  research.	  Guo	  and	  Bernstein	  (2004)	  argued	  that	   the	  conflict	  could	  arise	  because	   the	   foundation	  of	   their	   legitimacy	  and	  authority	  differs,	  and	  a	  possible	  solution	   is	   to	  merge	  these	  two	   institutions	  by	  asking	  party	  secretary	   to	  run	   for	  the	  post	  of	  village	  chief.	  Besides,	  He	  (2003)	  argued	  that	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  self-­‐governing	   village	   and	   the	   upper-­‐level	   government	  may	   also	   be	   in	   trouble.	  While	   the	   party	   secretary	   in	   villages	   serves	   as	   the	   agent	   of	   upper-­‐level	   party	  branch,	   the	   elected	   village	   committee	   is	   not	   necessarily	   obedient	   to	   the	  upper-­‐level	  authorities.	  Li	   (2002)	   further	  explained	   the	   two-­‐committee	  conflict	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  party	  and	  villagers.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	   functions	   of	   these	   two	   committees	   are	   overlapped	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   village	  governance,	   resulting	   in	   a	   paradox	   that	   emphasizing	   the	   party	   leadership	  will	  paralyze	   the	   self-­‐governance,	   while	   highlighting	   the	   self-­‐governance	   will	  deteriorate	  the	  party	  leadership.	  Regarding	  “Qingxian	  Model”,	  only	  a	  few	  scholars,	  all	  of	  whom	  are	  Chinese,	  focused	  on	   its	   function	  and	   implication.	  Among	   these	  research	  works,	   there	  do	  have	   some	   valuable	   pieces,	   such	   as	   Peng	   and	   Shangguan	   (2008)’s	   paper	   “the	  political	   participation	   after	   local	   election:	   an	   example	   of	   the	   villagers	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representative	  assembly	   in	   ‘Qingxian	  Model’”,	  Wang	  (2009)’s	  paper	  “improving	  the	   village	   self-­‐autonomy:	   the	   analysis	   of	   ‘Qingxian	  Model’”,	   Liu	   et	   al.	   (2010)’s	  paper	  “from	  grassroots	  democracy	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law:	  a	  survey	  of	  Qing	  County’s	  villager	   self-­‐autonomy”,	   and	   Lian	   et	   al.	   (2009)’s	   paper	   “get	   rid	   of	   the	  two-­‐dimension	  dilemma	  in	  the	  authority	  delineation	  of	  party	  branch	  and	  village	  committee:	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  ‘Qingxian	  Model’”.	  However,	  the	  basic	  argument	  of	   these	   papers	   is	   similar.	   They	   all	   first	   describe	   causes	   and	   functions	   of	  “Qingxian	   Model”	   in	   detail	   and	   then	   basically	   affirm	   the	   positive	   influence	   of	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  on	  enhancing	   the	  party’s	   leadership,	  overcoming	   the	  existing	  conflict	   and	   protecting	   villagers’	   rights.	   However,	   few	   of	   these	   studies	   have	  mentioned	   the	   institutional	   problem	   inside	   the	   “Qingxian	   Model”	   and	   the	  potential	  harm	  it	  can	  exert	  on	  Chinese	  local	  democracy.	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Chapter	  Three:	  Background	  of	  Chinese	  Village	  Elections	  
Local	  leaders	  in	  China’s	  administrative	  structure	  have	  always	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  enforcing	  state	  policies	  and	  fulfilling	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  local	  villagers	  due	  to	  the	  large	  geographic	  scope	  and	  the	  decentralization	  nature	  inherited	  since	  as	  early	   as	   the	   Mao	   era.	   (Cai	   &	   Treisman,	   2006)	   Up	   to	   2009,	   there	   have	   been	  691,510	   administrative	   villages	   in	   China,	   which	   widely	   distributed	   across	   the	  Chinese	  territory.	  Even	  though	  the	  village	  is	  not	  an	  official	   level	  of	  government,	  leaders	   at	   this	   level	   still	   serve	   as	   key	   political	   and	   economic	   actors	   in	  determining	  the	  fate	  of	  China’s	  villagers.	  During	   the	  collectivization	  era,	   the	  production	   team	  (shengchan	  dadui)	  was	  the	  only	   legal	  organization	  in	   local	  areas.	  Basically,	  all	  villagers	  and	  households	  in	  a	  certain	  area	  must	  be	  enrolled	  in	  a	  local	  production	  team.	  Though	  the	  size	  of	  production	   teams	   varied	   depending	   on	   the	   local	   population,	   their	   main	  responsibilities	   were	   the	   same,	   consisting	   of	   organizing	   team	   members	   to	  conduct	  collective	  economic	  activities,	  allocating	  local	  goods	  and	  compensations,	  and	   conducting	   political	   and	   ideological	   educations.	   (Oi,	   1989)	   In	   such	   an	  organization	  simultaneously	  possessing	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  function,	  the	  power	  delineation	  was	  clear.	  The	  production	  team	  leader,	  who	  is	  almost	  always	  a	  party	  member,	  served	  a	  dualistic	  role.	  Towards	  the	  general	  team	  members,	   the	  team	  leader	  strictly	  controls	  the	  over-­‐all	  power,	  most	  importantly	  the	  allocation	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power	   of	   public	   resources.	   However,	   as	   the	   agent	   of	   upper-­‐level	   communal	  officials,	   the	   team	   leader	   has	   to	   follow	   their	   command	   and	   finish	   the	   task	  mandated	  by	  them.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  a	  perfect	  vertical	  power	  structure,	  in	  which	  the	   team	   leader	   is	   the	   gatekeeper	   of	   resources	   and	   opportunities	   for	   the	   team	  and	  its	  members,	  but	  also	  the	  executor	  and	  enforcer	  of	  mandated	  policies	  from	  above.	   Although	   local	   governments	   had	   already	   emerged	   before	   popular	  elections,	   they	  could	  seldom	  exert	  any	   leverage	  to	  the	  existing	  power	  structure	  as	  team	  leaders,	  who	  are	  also	  party	  cadres,	  still	  strictly	  held	  the	  general	  power,	  and	   government	   leaders	   in	   this	   system	   served	   only	   as	   the	   executor	   under	   the	  control	  of	  production	  team.	  Though	  there	  were	  elections	  of	   local	  party	   leaders,	  due	  to	  the	  “intra-­‐party	  democracy”	  rule	  of	  CCP,	  villagers	  had	  no	  influence	  at	  all	  as	  the	   candidates	   were	   pre-­‐selected	   by	   the	   upper-­‐level	   party	   committee	   and	   the	  election	   was	   only	   open	   to	   party	   members.	   In	   this	   sense,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   this	  vertical	  power	  structure	  is	  adaptable	  to	  the	  collective	  economy	  pattern	  as	  it	  can	  maximize	  party	  cadres’	  allocation	  and	  distribution	  power	  of	  public	  resources.	  However,	  since	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  initiated	  the	  decollectivization	  reform	  in	  1978,	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  changes	  have	  largely	  influenced	  the	  CCP	  governance	  in	  rural	   areas.	   First,	   after	   initiating	   the	   decollectivization	   reform,	   most	   original	  production	   teams	   became	   village	   small	   groups	   (xiaozu),	   a	   subordinate	  organization	  in	  villages	  retaining	  little	  economic	  power.	  Instead,	  the	  family	  per	  se	  became	   the	   unit	   of	   production	   and	   accounting,	   taking	   care	   of	   its	   resources	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allocation,	   such	   as	   the	   grain,	   fertilizer,	   and	   harvest	   alone.	   Unlike	   the	  circumstances	   during	   collectivization	   era	   when	   rural	   households	   mainly	  depended	  on	  the	  sharing	  of	  public	  goods,	  villagers	  basically	  controlled	  their	  own	  fates	   after	   the	   reform,	   making	   them	   cherish	   more	   on	   private	   surplus	   and	  simultaneously	   became	   more	   resistant	   to	   unpopular	   policies	   mandated	   from	  above	   as	   these	  policies	  would	  deprive	   certain	  part	   of	   their	   private	   goods.	   This	  transformation	   therefore	   made	   unpopular	   policies	   harder	   to	   enforce	   in	   local	  areas.	   Since	   local	   cadres	   are	   the	   agents	   of	   central	   government,	   villagers	  would	  naturally	  express	  their	  anger	  to	  these	  cadres,	  which	  deteriorated	  the	  cadre-­‐mass	  relations.	   	  Besides,	  local	  party	  secretaries	  themselves	  also	  became	  less	  prestigious	  since	  the	  decollectivization	  reform.	  Age	  and	  corruption	  were	  two	  main	  problems.	  First,	  the	  aging	  problem	  of	  local	  cadres	  began	  to	  perplex	  CCP	  senior	  leaders	  as	  early	  as	  in	   1970s.	   (Li	  &	  O’Brien,	   1995)	  As	   there	  was	   no	   genuine	   limit	   on	   party	   cadres’	  tenure,	   most	   of	   them,	   who	   assumed	   the	   position	   since	   the	   foundation	   of	   new	  China,	  never	  stepped	  down.	  This	  problem	  became	  severer	  after	  the	  reform	  was	  initiated	  as	  these	  old	  “local	  emperors”	  who	  were	  armed	  with	  the	  Mao	  doctrines	  can	  hardly	  understand	  and	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  new	  development.	  As	  of	  2001,	  there	  were	  1,357,000	  party	  branches	  in	  rural	  China	  with	  a	  total	  party	  membership	  of	  29.5	   million,	   but	   among	   these	   local	   branches,	   as	   many	   as	   356,000	   were	  experienced	   rectifications	   from	   1994	   to	   2000	   due	   to	   their	   weakness.	   (Guo	   &	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Bernstein,	   2004)	   Besides,	   the	   corruptive	   problem	   also	   became	   furious	   in	   local	  areas	  after	  decollectivization.	  Since	  CCP	  largely	  decentralized	  decisive	  power	  to	  local	   cadres	   to	   decide	   local	   affairs,	   party	   secretaries	   then	   possessed	   the	   final	  discretion	  on	  the	  surplus	  of	  public	  goods	  as	  long	  as	  they	  submitted	  the	  required	  amount	   of	   money	   and	   goods	   to	   higher-­‐level	   authorities.	   In	   this	   situation,	   the	  high-­‐speed	  economic	  development	   in	   local	   areas	  would	   create	  great	   incentives	  for	   these	   cadres	   to	   seek	   illegal	   rents	   without	   effective	   monitor	   from	   above,	  resulting	  in	  the	  large	  agency	  costs	  of	  central	  government.	   	  Based	   on	   these	   realities,	   CCP	   senior	   leaders	   decided	   to	   introduce	   popular	  elections	  in	  rural	  areas	  in	  1987	  with	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  Organic	  Law	  of	  Village	  Committee.	   The	   original	   purposes	   of	   holding	   local	   elections	  were	   on	   one	  hand	  letting	  villagers	  to	  decide	  their	  own	  leaders	  so	  that	  the	  popularly	  elected	  cadres	  could	   help	   enforce	   unpopular	   policies	   from	   above,	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand	  transferring	  the	  monitoring	  responsibility	  on	  local	  cadres	  to	  vernacular	  villagers	  so	   that	   the	   corruptive	   activities	   can	   be	   effectively	   contained.	   Then	   with	   this	  political	  experiment,	  cadre-­‐mass	  relations	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  mitigated	  and	  the	  provision	   of	   public	   goods	   was	   expected	   to	   be	   prompted.	   (The	   Carter	   Center,	  1998)	  However,	  as	  the	  1987	  Organic	  Law	  only	  provided	  the	  basic	  principles	  for	  the	  village	   elections	   without	   a	   specific	   stipulation	   on	   electoral	   process,	   every	  province	   produced	   its	   own	   electoral	   rules	   and	   measurements	   based	   on	   these	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principles.	  In	  1998,	  the	  revised	  version	  of	  the	  Organic	  Law	  was	  put	  forward	  with	  more	  detailed	  stipulations	  on	  the	  electoral	  process,	  but	  formal	  regulations	  on	  the	  whole	  electoral	  process	  were	  still	  absent	  and	  one	  continued	  to	  observe	  a	  great	  deal	   of	   variations	   across	   provinces.	   (Wang,	   2008)	   According	   to	   the	   record	   of	  Ministry	   of	   Civil	   Affairs	   (MCA),	   the	   first	   province	   to	   conduct	   province-­‐wide	  village	   elections	   was	   Fujian	   in	   1982,	   and	   the	   last	   province	   to	   conduct	   local	  elections	  was	  Yunnan	  in	  2001.	  By	  the	  year	  of	  2005,	  98%	  of	  villages	  in	  China	  had	  initiated	  at	  least	  one	  election.	  (Wang,	  2009)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  The	  Procedures	  of	  Chinese	  Village	  Election	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There	  are	  five	  stages	  of	  a	  whole	  electoral	  process	  for	  Chinese	  village	  elections	  based	   on	   the	   stipulations	   of	   Organic	   Law,	   namely	   organizing	   Village	   Election	  Committee	   (VEC),	   voter	   registration,	   candidate	   nomination,	   ballot	   casting,	   and	  the	  publication	  of	  electoral	  results.	  To	  start	  an	  election,	   the	  village	  must	   first	  organize	  a	  VEC.	  The	  VEC	  member	  should	   be	   nominated	   and	   elected	   by	   the	   Village	   Assembly	   (VA),	   Village	  Representative	   Assembly	   (VRA),	   and	   the	   Village	   Team	   (cunmin	   xiaozu).	  According	   to	   the	   “avoidance	   rule”,	   a	  VEC	  member	  should	  quit	   the	  committee	   if	  she	  or	  her	  relatives	  later	  becomes	  the	  candidate.	  (Article	  12)	   	  After	  the	  VEC	  has	  been	  organized,	  the	  committee	  should	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  next	   step,	   voter	   registration.	  According	   to	   the	  Organic	  Law,	   all	   villagers	  whose	  age	  has	  past	  eighteen	  years	  possess	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  and	  to	  be	  voted,	  regardless	  of	  their	  ethnics,	  races,	  genders,	  occupations,	  family	  background,	  religious	  belief,	  education	  level,	  financial	  status,	  and	  residential	  length.	  The	  only	  exception	  is	  that	  the	  people	  who	  have	  been	  deprived	  of	  political	   rights	   cannot	  vote.	   (Article	  13)	  When	   the	   vote	   registration	   is	   finished,	   the	   VEC	   should	   publish	   the	   voter	   list	  twenty	  days	  before	  the	  election	  day.	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   candidate	   nomination,	   the	   Organic	   Law	   stipulates	   that	   the	  candidates	   should	   be	   nominated	   directly	   by	   registered	   voters.	   Besides,	   the	  candidate’s	  number	  should	  exceed	  the	  number	  of	  seats.	  (Article	  15)	  In	  practice,	  different	   provinces	   develop	   their	   own	   nomination	   ways.	   Candidates	   can	   be	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nominated	  by	  individual	  voters	  as	  well	  as	  by	  groups	  (group	  nomination).	  Besides,	  a	  voter	  can	  nominate	  others	  or	  himself	  (self	  nomination).	   	  Then	  on	  the	  election	  day,	  all	  ballot	  should	  be	  cast	  anonymously	  and	  counted	  publically.	  Once	  the	  counting	  process	  is	  finished,	  the	  result	  must	  be	  published	  at	  once.	   (Article	   15)	   For	   those	  who	   are	   disabled,	   a	   roving	  box	   should	  be	   applied.	  The	  election	  is	  valid	  only	  if	  more	  than	  half	  of	  registered	  voters	  come	  to	  vote.	  To	  win	  a	  position,	   the	   candidate	  must	  obtain	  more	   than	  half	   of	   valid	  votes.	   If	   two	  candidates	   running	   for	   the	   same	   position	   obtain	   the	   same	   number	   of	   votes,	   a	  run-­‐off	  election	  should	  be	  held	  to	  determine	  the	  final	  result.	  (Article	  15)	  From	  the	  description	  of	  electoral	  rules	  above,	  we	  can	  see	  that	   if	   those	  rules	  are	   followed	   well,	   the	   elected	   village	   committee	   can	   be	   counted	   as	   a	  self-­‐governance	   organization	   in	   Chinese	   rural	   area.	   However,	   as	   China	   is	   a	  party-­‐state,	   in	   which	   Chinese	   Communist	   Party	   (CCP)	   is	   the	   only	   incumbent	  party,	  the	  party	  branch	  in	  the	  village	  will	  also	  obtain	  certain	  discretion	  over	  local	  affairs	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   the	   CCP	   control	   in	   rural	   areas.	   Though	   the	   CCP	  demands	  that	  members	  of	  the	  party	  branch	  should	  also	  be	  elected	  by	  the	  party	  members	   in	   village,	   the	   positions,	   in	   practice,	   are	   mostly	   assigned	   by	   the	  upper-­‐level	   party	   organization,	   i.e.,	   the	   villagers	   have	   no	   rights	   to	   decide	   the	  party	   branch	   member.	   Then	   what	   is	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   assigned	   party	  branch	   and	  elected	  village	   committee?	  At	   least	   in	   the	  Organic	   Law,	   there	   is	   no	  clear	  answer.	  According	   to	  Article	  3,	   the	  party	  branch	  should	   take	  a	   leadership	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role	   in	   supporting	   and	   protecting	   villagers’	   self-­‐governance,	  while	   in	   Article	   5,	  the	   law	   stipulates	   that	   the	   village	   committee	   should	   support	   and	   organize	  villagers	  to	  conduct	  economic	  activities,	  and	  take	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  local	  productive	   service.	   The	   potential	   power-­‐sharing	   puzzle	   just	   lies	   in	   the	   unclear	  power	  demarcation	  above.	  It	   is	   not	   hard	   to	   perceive	   the	   contradiction	   of	   the	   CCP’s	   legislators.	  On	   one	  hand,	   pressed	   by	   the	   rural	   decollectivization	   and	   development,	   the	   central	  government	   has	   to	   endow	   more	   autonomous	   rights	   to	   villagers	   to	   keep	   the	  stability	  there,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  800	  million	  populations	  of	  peasants	  are	  always	  a	  big	  group	  of	  the	  potential	  revolts	  if	  the	  CCP	  losing	  the	  control,	  especially	  when	   the	   central	   elites	   are	   instructed	   by	   thousand	   times	   that	   it	   was	   the	  dependence	  on	  peasants	  that	  led	  to	  the	  CCP’s	  victory	  in	  the	  civil	  war	  against	  the	  former	   KMT.	   Thus,	   this	   contradiction	   caused	   the	   unclear	   power	   delineation	   of	  party	  branches	  and	  village	  committees,	  which	  further	  led	  to	  the	  conflict	  between	  party	   cadres	   and	  village	   chiefs	   in	  practice.	   For	  party	   cadres,	   they	   are	   confused	  about	   the	   meaning	   to	   have	   elected	   VC	   as	   long	   as	   the	   party	   secretary	   still	  possesses	  the	  “core	   leadership”.	  Elected	  village	  chiefs	  are	  also	  perplexed	  that	   if	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  CCP	  must	  be	  adhered	  to,	  why	  bother	  initiating	  democratic	  elections	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  While	  for	  upper-­‐level	  officials,	  what	  their	  concerned	  most	  are	  whether	  the	  elected	  VCs	  would	  fully	  carry	  out	  instructions	  from	  above	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  when	  party	  secretaries	  are	  in	  charge.	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In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  will	  develop	  a	  pure	  strategic	  model	  to	  explain	  how	  village	   elections	   influence	   the	   interactions	  between	  party	   secretary	   and	  village	  chief	  regarding	  different	  types	  of	  public	  policies.	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Chapter	  Four:	  The	  Model	  and	  Supportive	  Evidences	  
China	   is	   a	   dominant-­‐party	   state,	   in	   which	   the	   formal	   institutions	   of	   the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	   (CCP)	  and	  of	   the	  government	  are	   tightly	   intertwined	  from	  the	  center	  to	  the	  lowest	  level.	   	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  The	  Power	  Structure	  of	  Chinese	  Political	  Authorities	  after	  1988	  
Organic	  Law	  
	  In	   Figure	   two,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   vertically,	   there	   are	   six-­‐level	   party	  organizations	  and	   correspond	  governments,	  namely	   the	   state,	   province,	   city	  or	  prefecture,	   county,	   township,	   and	   village.	   Vertically,	   the	   upper-­‐level	   authority	  leads	  the	  lower-­‐level	  one,	  with	  only	  one	  exception,	  which	  is	  the	  relation	  between	  township-­‐level	  government	  and	  village	  committee.	  According	  to	  the	  Organic	  Law	  of	   Village	   Committee,	   the	   township-­‐level	   government	   can	   only	   offer	   “support,	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help,	   and	   guidance”	   to	   the	   village	   committee’s	  work,	   but	   cannot	   intervene	   the	  village	   committee	   to	   run	   their	   own	   business.	   (Article	   3)	   Besides,	   the	   village	  committee	   just	   needs	   to	   “help”	   township	   authority	   to	   conduct	   their	   work,	  without	  necessity	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  upper-­‐level	  government.	   In	  this	  sense,	  unlike	  relations	  between	  other	  vertical	  authorities,	   the	  village	  committee	  owns	  its	  own	  independence.	  Horizontally,	   the	  party	  organization	   leads	  the	  administrative	  unit	   in	  each	  of	  the	   first	   five	   levels.	  The	  only	  exception	  also	  occurs	  at	   the	   lowest	   level	  between	  village	   committee	   and	   local	   party	   branch.	   Just	   as	   I	   have	   described	   above,	  relations	   between	   these	   two	   authorities	   are	   not	   well	   defined.	   Besides,	   the	  selection	   methods	   of	   members	   in	   these	   two	   authorities	   are	   totally	   different.	  Members	   in	   party	   branch	   are	   mostly	   assigned	   by	   the	   upper-­‐level	   party	  organization,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  party	  branch	  in	  village	  will	  be	  accountable	  to	  upper-­‐level	  authorities.	  As	   for	  members	   in	   the	  village	  committee,	   if	  we	  assume	  that	   the	  village	  election	   is	   free	  and	  competitive,	   they	  will	  be	  elected	  by	  eligible	  villagers,	  and	  according	  to	  the	  Organic	  Law,	  if	  more	  than	  one	  fifth	  of	  the	  voters	  jointly	   sign	   their	   names,	   they	   can	   propose	   to	   dismiss	   the	   irresponsible	  committee	   members	   with	   a	   justifiable	   reason.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   village	  committee	  is	  accountable	  to	  villagers.	  (Guo,	  2004)	  Then	  what	   are	   the	  main	   tasks	   for	   village	   officials?	   In	   China,	   village	   leaders	  basically	  have	  three	  responsibilities,	  namely	  the	  enforcement	  of	  state	  directives,	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the	   fulfillment	   of	   township	   demands,	   and	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   goods.	  Traditionally,	   state	   policies	   include	   the	   birth	   control,	   land	   expropriation,	   and	  state	   tax	  collection.	  But	  with	   the	  abolition	  of	  agricultural	   tax	   in	  2006,	  villagers’	  burden	   has	   been	   largely	   relieved.	   Regarding	   the	   requirements	   from	   township	  authorities,	  before	  the	  political	  decentralization	  in	  1980s	  when	  villages	  were	  still	  under	  tightly	  control,	   the	  township	  government	  had	  the	  financial	  responsibility	  to	  fund	  the	  village	  public	  goods	  and	  services.	  In	  return,	  villages	  need	  to	  share	  a	  certain	   ratio	   of	   their	   revenue	   with	   township	   authorities.	   After	   the	  decentralization,	   nominally	   each	   level	   government	   has	   been	   responsible	   for	  funding	   and	   organizing	   public	   goods	   for	   citizens	   under	   their	   jurisdiction,	   and	  simultaneously	   keeps	   any	   revenues	   in	   excess	   of	   a	   preset	   amount	   they	   are	  required	  to	  deliver	  upwards.	  (Tsai,	  2007)	  In	  reality,	  villages	  can	  hardly	  get	  any	  fund	  from	  above	  and	  have	  to	  mainly	  count	  on	  themselves	  to	  generate	  revenues	  because	  the	  state	  funds	  allocated	  to	  provinces	  have	  been	  “shared”	  by	  each	  level	  governments	   and	   when	   they	   come	   to	   the	   lowest	   level,	   nothing	   is	   barely	   left.	  Simultaneously,	   township	   governments	   lose	   the	   justifiable	   reason	   to	   share	   the	  revenues	  generated	  by	  village.	  Instead,	  they	  have	  to	  open	  some	  informal	  channel	  to	   fund	   their	   public	   expenditures.	   These	   informal	   institutions	   include	   the	  establishment	   of	   various	   levies,	   fees,	   and	   fines,	   which	   are	   generally	   called	  “extrabudgetary	  funds”	  as	  raising	  these	  funds	  do	  not	  need	  explicit	  authorization	  from	   above	   as	   long	   as	   they	   are	   not	   violating	   existing	   regulations.	   (Tsai,	   2007)	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However,	   these	   funds	  are	  extremely	  sensitive	   to	   the	  villagers	  who	  have	   largely	  earned	   their	   discretion	   of	   self-­‐governance.	   (Li,	   2002)	   The	   third	   responsibility,	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  services	  such	  as	  roads,	  water,	  electricity,	  land	  allocation,	   and	   rural	   education,	   is	   relatively	   easy	   to	   understand.	   As	   village	  leaders,	   to	   enhance	   the	   local	   economic	   and	   social	   development	   is	   always	   their	  priority.	  As	   I	   described	   in	   Chapter	   Three,	   before	   initiating	   village	   elections,	   party	  secretary	   possessed	   greater	   discretion	   on	   local	   affairs,	   and	   village	   chief	   only	  served	  as	  the	  executor	  to	  enforce	  party	  cadres’	  demands.	  Besides,	  as	  both	  party	  secretary	  and	  village	  chief	  were	  appointed	  by	  upper-­‐level	  authorities,	  they	  must	  simultaneously	   follow	  mandates	   from	   above.	   In	   this	   institutional	   setting,	   there	  will	   be	   no	   obvious	   conflict	   between	   both	   village	   leaders	   and	   they	   will	   jointly	  enforce	   popular	   and	   unpopular	   policies	   mandated	   from	   above	   without	   any	  divergence.	  Sometimes	  they	  may	  use	  coercions	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  potential	  popular	  resistance	  on	  certain	  unpopular	  policy	  to	  protect	  their	  principals’	  interests.	   	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  The	  Power	  Structure	  between	  Township	  and	  Village	  Authorities	  
before	  1988	  Organic	  Law	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  Though	   this	   governance	   type	   can	   effectively	   prompt	   the	   delivery	   of	   public	  policies,	  it	  may	  also	  instigate	  villagers’	  dissatisfactions,	  and	  the	  accumulation	  of	  anger	  may	   finally	   result	   in	   the	   instability	  of	   local	  areas.	  Besides,	  as	  upper-­‐level	  principals	   can	   hardly	   exert	   effective	   monitor	   on	   local	   cadres	   and	   villagers	  possess	   no	   right	   to	   do	   so,	   village	   leaders	   then	   have	   strong	   incentives	   to	  participate	  in	  illegal	  rent-­‐seeking	  activities,	  which	  will	  sabotage	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  generate	  great	  agency	  lost	  for	  upper-­‐level	  authorities.	  After	   1988	   Organic	   Law,	   the	   local	   governance	   pattern	   has	   been	   changed	  greatly	   since	   village	   chief	   and	   party	   secretary	   are	   accountable	   to	   different	  principals.	   Then,	   when	   facing	   the	   tasks	   above,	   will	   they	   have	   conflict	   policy	  preferences?	   If	   so,	   in	   what	   kind	   of	   specific	   public	   policy	   will	   they	   fight	   each	  other?	  
4.1	  The	  Formal	  Model	  
I	  will	  develop	  two	  separate	  models	  to	  formulate	   interactions	  between	  party	  branch	   and	   village	   committee	  when	   dealing	  with	   two	   types	   of	   public	   policies,	  consistent	  policies	  and	  contentious	  policies.	  Basically,	  consistent	  policies	  mainly	  focus	   on	   the	   provision	   of	   certain	   public	   goods,	   such	   as	   the	   construction	   of	  modern	  roads,	  the	  advanced	  irrigation	  system,	  the	  establishment	  of	  rural	  schools,	  and	   the	   allocation	   of	   public	   lands.	   As	   villagers	  will	   generally	   benefit	   from	   this	  type	  of	  policies,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  such	  policies	  will	  be	  acceptable	  and	  welcome.	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However,	  contentious	  policies,	  such	  as	  the	  birth	  control,	  the	  land	  expropriation,	  and	   the	   illegal	   levy	   of	   revenue	   from	   the	   township	   government,	   are	   relatively	  difficult	  to	  execute	  in	  rural	  areas	  they	  jeopardize	  villagers’	  interests.	   	  In	  both	  models,	  there	  are	  two	  players,	  the	  village	  chief	  (VC),	  who	  represents	  the	   village	   committee,	   and	   the	   party	   secretary	   (PS)	   representing	   local	   party	  branch.	   Regarding	   both	   types	   of	   public	   policies,	   both	   players	   can	   choose	   to	  accept	  (A)	  and	  enforce	  them	  in	  village,	  or	  reject	  (R)	  and	  appeal	  to	  a	  higher-­‐level	  office	  to	  protect	  the	  villagers’	  interests.	  For	  both	  players,	  I	  assume	  that:	   	  (A).	   They	   both	   possess	   paralleled	   discretion	   over	   the	   decision-­‐making	  process	  of	  certain	  policies;	  (B).	   Institutional	   effect	   outweighs	   strategic	   effect,	   meaning	   that	   their	  preferences	  are	  determined	  by	  legal	  provisions	  and	  institutional	  settings	  rather	  than	  the	  expectations	  from	  upper-­‐level	  authorities;	  (C).	  Both	  players	  are	  rational	  players,	  caring	  only	  about	  their	  own	  interests;	  (D).	   As	   both	   players	   have	   the	   same	   discretion,	   when	   they	   choose	   different	  actions,	  they	  will	  both	  have	  the	  same	  chance	  to	  win	  out.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  payoff,	  “a”	  denotes	  the	  benefits	  for	  both	  players	  if	  the	  outcome	  is	   consistent	  with	   their	  preferences;	   “w”	  denotes	   the	  punishment	   for	   the	  party	  secretary	   if	   her	   choice	   is	   inconsistent	   with	   her	   principal,	   i.e.,	   the	   upper-­‐level	  authorities;	  “x”	  denotes	  the	  cost	  for	  village	  chief	  if	  her	  action	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  villagers’	  interest;	  and	  “t”	  denotes	  the	  transaction	  cost	  in	  the	  circumstance	  when	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player	  choose	  different	  actions.	  To	  better	  understand	  it,	  we	  can	  assume	  it	  to	  be	  the	   extra	   punishment	   on	   both	   players	   for	   the	   delay	   of	   the	   initiation	   of	   public	  policies	   resulting	   from	   conflict	   preferences	   between	   the	   village	   chief	   and	   the	  party	   secretary.	   Besides,	   we	   further	   assume	   that	   compared	   with	   benefits	   and	  punishments,	  the	  extra	  transaction	  cost	  “t”	  is	  relatively	  small.	  Below	  are	  the	  two	  models	  respectively.	  
4.1.1.	  Model	  1:	  Pure	  Strategic	  Game	  on	  Consistent	  Policies	  
The	  concrete	  payoff	  for	  both	  players	  regarding	  different	  actions	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4.	  As	  this	  type	  of	  policies	  is	  mainly	  related	  to	  the	  provision	  and	  allocation	  of	  certain	  public	  goods,	  villagers	  will	  generally	  gain	  benefits.	  In	  this	  sense,	  both	  village	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary	  will	  tend	  to	  enforce	  such	  policies.	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Pure	  Strategic	  Game	  on	  Consistent	  Public	  Policies	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In	   this	   figure,	   when	   both	   players	   choose	   to	   accept,	   policies	   will	   surely	   be	  enforced	  and	  both	  players	  will	  gain	  the	  total	  benefit	  “a”.	  If	  one	  player	  chooses	  to	  accept	  while	  the	  other	  chooses	  to	  reject,	  certain	  policy	  will	  have	  half	  chance	  to	  be	  enforced	   and	   half	   chance	   to	   be	   tabled.	   Regardless	   of	   the	   result,	   as	   players	   in	  these	  two	  situations	  have	  different	  choices,	  transaction	  cost	  “t”	  will	  be	  added	  to	  both	  players.	  Besides,	  the	  player	  who	  chooses	  to	  reject	  the	  policies	  will	  assume	  an	   additional	   cost	   (“x”	   for	   village	   chief	   and	   “w”	   for	   party	   secretary)	   as	   their	  actions	  are	  controvert	  with	  their	  principals’	  preferences.	  If	  both	  players	  choose	  to	   reject,	   policies	   will	   surely	   be	   tabled.	   In	   this	   situation,	   no	   profits	   will	   be	  distributed	  on	  either	  side.	  Besides,	  they	  all	  have	  to	  suffer	  from	  the	  punishment.	  By	  solving	  this	  game,	  we	  can	  easily	  figure	  out	  that	  the	  only	  Nash	  Equilibrium	  is	   the	   situation	   in	  which	   both	   players	   choose	   to	   accept	   and	   enforce	   the	   public	  policies.	   This	   result	   is	   quite	   intuitive.	   For	   the	   party	   secretary,	   she	  will	   always	  prefer	  to	  follow	  upper-­‐level	  mandates	  regardless	  of	  concrete	  policy	  types.	  In	  this	  particular	   situation,	   the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  services	  will	   surely	  help	  maintain	  the	  stability	  in	  rural	  areas,	  which	  for	  CCP	  is	  the	  highest	  priority.	  For	  the	  village	  chief,	  although	  she	  also	  chooses	   to	  accept	   the	  policies,	   the	  motivation	   is	  not	  originated	   from	  upper-­‐level	   authorities’	  demand,	  but	   from	  villagers’	  needs.	  In	  sum,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  conflict	  between	  the	  village	  chief	  and	  the	  party	  secretary	  when	  consistent	  policies	  are	  mandated	  from	  above.	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4.1.2.	  Model	  2:	  Pure	  Strategic	  Game	  on	  Contentious	  State	  Policies	  
In	  this	  model,	  this	  type	  of	  public	  policies	  must	  fulfill	  two	  requirements.	  First,	  there	   are	   divergent	   preferences	   between	   state	   villagers	   and	   upper-­‐level	  governments.	  Enforcing	  such	  policies	  in	  villages	  will	  surely	  jeopardize	  villagers’	  interest.	   Second,	   elected	   village	   chiefs	   must	   possess	   certain	   discretion	   in	   the	  implementation	  process	  of	  such	  policies.	  With	  these	  qualifications,	  the	  one-­‐child	  policy,	   land	  expropriation	  policy,	   and	   the	   illegal	   revenue	   levy	   from	  upper-­‐level	  governments	  can	  perfectly	  fit	  into	  this	  type.	  The	  one-­‐child	  policy,	  initiated	  in	  1979,	  regulates	  that	  each	  family	  could	  only	  have	   one	   child	   in	   order	   to	   control	   the	   birth	   fertility.	   However,	   this	   policy	   is	  strongly	   controversial	   to	   Chinese	   traditional	   thought,	   which	   is	   still	   popular	  nowadays	   in	  most	   Chinese	   rural	   areas.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   tension	   between	   the	  central	   authorities’	  demand	  of	   shrinking	   the	   fertility	  and	  villagers’	  will	   to	  have	  more	  children	  is	  still	  existing,	  even	  though	  there	  are	  some	  exemptions	  permitted	  by	  the	  state.	  For	  example	   in	  some	  area,	   if	   the	  first	  child	   is	  a	  girl,	   the	  family	  can	  have	  one	  more	  child,	  and	  if	   the	  couple	  are	  all	  single	  child	  of	  their	  parents,	   they	  can	  have	  at	  most	  two	  children.	  Under	  the	  pressure	  of	  this	  tension,	  village	  leaders,	  who	  possess	  certain	  discretion	  over	  the	  enforcement	  of	  birth	  control,	  can	  choose	  either	  to	  fulfill	  the	  mandate	  from	  above,	  or	  to	  be	  accountable	  to	  the	  villagers	  by	  helping	  them	  petition	  for	  more	  ratios.	  The	   land	   expropriation	   policy	   is	   also	   under	   great	   debate	   in	   current	   China.	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According	   to	   the	   Organic	   Law	   of	   China’s	   Land	   (China	   Legal	   Publishing	   House,	  2011),	   the	   upper-­‐level	   government	   can	   expropriate	   certain	   amount	   of	   land	   in	  rural	   areas	   to	   satisfy	   modern	   use,	   including	   the	   public	   use	   such	   as	   the	  construction	  of	  national	  or	  provincial	  highways,	  and	  the	  private	  use	  such	  as	  the	  establishment	   of	   township	   enterprises.	   These	   activities	   will	   result	   in	   the	  permanent	   loss	   of	   farmland	   to	   villagers.	   (Cai	   2003)	   Although	   strict	   limitations	  are	  imposed	  on	  this	  behavior	  by	  legal	  provisions,	  they	  are	  occasionally	  violated	  by	  the	  upper-­‐level	  governments,	  which	  exacerbates	  villagers’	  hostility.	  Similar	  to	  the	  one-­‐child	  policy,	  the	  village	  chief	  still	  possesses	  certain	  discretion	  to	  choose	  whether	   to	   follow	   the	   command	   above	   or	   delay	   the	   expropriation	   by	   lobbying	  upper-­‐level	  government.	  In	   terms	   of	   “extrabudgetary	   funds”	   that	   the	   township	   leaders	   collect	   from	  villages,	   just	  as	  I	  described	  above,	  are	  also	  extremely	  sensitive	  to	  villagers	  once	  they	   figure	   out	   the	   truth.	   As	   villagers	   can	   hardly	   gain	   any	   regular	   funds	   from	  above,	   they	  will	   cherish	   any	   coin	   they	   earn	   by	   their	   own	   hands.	   In	   this	   sense,	  village	  leaders	  are	  always	  under	  great	  pressure	  to	  help	  levy	  this	  illegal	  money	  in	  villages.	  Instead,	  the	  village	  chief	  can	  petition	  to	  the	  higher-­‐level	  government	  to	  ask	   for	   the	   abolition	   of	   this	   informal	   extraction	   of	   revenue,	   thus	   defending	  villagers’	  interests.	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Figure	  5:	  Pure	  Strategic	  Game	  on	  Contentious	  Public	  Policies	  
	  
	   The	  payoff	  of	  both	  players	  is	  shown	  in	  figure	  5.	  In	  this	  game,	  the	  interactions	  between	  village	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary	  are	  surely	  zero-­‐sum,	  meaning	  that	  the	  profits	  gained	  by	  one	  player	  will	  cause	  the	  equal	  value	  loss	  of	  the	  other.	  In	  this	  situation,	  when	  both	  players	  choose	  to	  accept	  and	  enforce	  certain	  policies,	  party	  secretary	  will	  achieve	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  profit	  “a”,	  while	  village	  chief	  will	  suffer	  the	  punishment	  exerted	  by	  villagers	  as	  the	  policy	  outcome	  contravenes	  villagers’	  preference.	  Correspondingly,	  when	  both	  players	  choose	   to	  reject	  certain	  public	  policies,	   village	   chief	  will	   achieve	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   profits	   at	   the	   expense	  of	  party	  secretary’s	  loss.	  When	  the	  village	  chief	  chooses	  to	  accept	  the	  policies	  while	  the	   party	   secretary	   rejects	   them,	   both	   players	   will	   at	   first	   assume	   the	  punishment	  by	  their	  principals	  as	  neither	  of	  them	  follows	  principals’	  preferences.	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Besides,	  as	  both	  players	  have	  different	  actions,	  they	  both	  have	  half	  chance	  to	  win	  and	  half	  chance	  to	  lose	  during	  their	  fight,	  causing	  both	  of	  them	  to	  assume	  extra	  transaction	   costs.	   Finally,	   when	   village	   chief	   chooses	   to	   reject	   and	   party	  secretary	  chooses	  to	  accept,	  the	  punishment	  is	  avoided	  as	  both	  players	  stay	  with	  their	   principals’	   preferences.	   Since	   both	   players	   have	   the	   same	   chance	   to	  win,	  they	  will	  only	  possess	  half	  of	  their	  profit	  “a”	  plus	  the	  extra	  transaction	  cost.	  	   Compared	   these	   two	   models,	   we	   may	   find	   that	   when	   state	   and	   villagers’	  preferences	  change,	  the	  payoff	  for	  both	  players	  are	  totally	  different.	  In	  this	  model,	  the	   situation	   that	   both	   players	   choose	   to	   accept	   the	   policies	   is	   no	   longer	  equilibrium	  as	  when	  public	  policies	  jeopardize	  villagers’	  interest,	  accepting	  them	  will	  be	  worse	  off	  for	  village	  chief.	  Instead,	  the	  only	  Nash	  Equilibrium	  in	  this	  game	  is	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   village	   chief	   rejects	   and	   party	   secretary	   accepts	   the	  policy.	  
	   4.2	  The	  Implications	  of	  the	  Models	  
	   By	   developing	   two	   pure	   strategic	   models	   of	   interactions	   between	   villager	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary	  regarding	  two	  different	  types	  of	  state	  policies,	  we	  find	  two	  Nash	  Equilibra.	  When	  dealing	  with	   consistent	  public	  policies,	  both	  players	  will	   choose	   to	   accept.	  When	   dealing	  with	   contentious	   policies,	   party	   secretary	  chooses	  to	  accept	  while	  village	  chief	  chooses	  to	  refuse	  is	  the	  only	  stable	  situation.	   	  This	   result	   perfectly	   answers	   the	   research	   questions	   I	   put	   forward	   at	   the	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beginning	  of	  this	  paper.	  Since	  there	  exists	  power-­‐sharing	  puzzle	  between	  village	  chief	   and	  party	   secretary,	   both	  organizations	  possess	   same	  discretion	  over	   the	  decision-­‐making	   process	   of	   the	   enforcement	   of	   certain	   public	   policy.	   Conflicts	  between	  these	  two	  organizations	  will	  emerge	  only	  when	  state	  intends	  to	  impose	  certain	  unpopular	  policies	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  villagers’	  cost.	  In	  this	  situation,	  while	  party	  secretary	  chooses	  to	  follow	  the	  mandate	  above,	  elected	  village	  chief	  will	  be	  accountable	  to	  villagers	  by	  manipulating	  to	  delay	  the	  execution	  of	  such	  policies.	  This	   conflict,	   according	   to	   the	   second	  model,	   is	   stable	   as	   both	   players	   will	   be	  worse	  off	  if	  defecting	  to	  the	  other	  choice.	   	  	   What	  can	  we	  learn	  from	  this	  analysis?	  What	  political	  outcomes	  will	  emerge	  by	   introducing	  popular	  elections	   in	   rural	  areas?	  First,	   if	  we	  believe	   that	   formal	  institutions	   do	   matter	   once	   put	   into	   effect,	   we	   should	   confirm	   that	   with	   the	  expansion	  and	  amelioration	  of	  Chinese	  village	  elections,	  village	  chief	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  accountable	   to	   the	  general	  public	   for	   fear	  of	  being	  voted	  out	  of	  office.	  Regarding	   party	   secretaries	   in	   the	   local	   party	   branch,	   though	   they	   are	   not	  accountable	   to	   villagers,	   they	   still	   under	   the	   direct	   supervision	   of	   the	   general	  public,	   which	   means	   that	   villagers	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   lodge	   complaints	   to	  higher-­‐level	   authorities	   if	   party	   secretary	   commits	   any	   malfeasance.	   If	   this	  happens,	   the	   party	   secretary’s	   career	   may	   face	   severe	   challenge	   with	   the	  potential	  punishment	  from	  above.	  In	  this	  sense,	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  consistent	  public	   policies,	   both	   party	   secretary	   and	   village	   chief	   will	   tend	   to	   accept	   and	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enforce	  them	  in	  the	  village.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  the	  monitoring	  responsibility	  on	  local	  cadres	  has	  been	  transferred	  from	  upper-­‐level	  authorities	  to	  villagers	  after	  village	   elections,	   villagers	   can	   exert	   more	   effective	   and	   direct	   supervision	   on	  local	   cadres’	   behavior,	   thus	   avoiding	   potential	   loss	   of	   profits	   by	   preventing	  potential	   embezzlement	   and	   corruptive	   activities	   from	   local	   cadres,	   which	   are	  quite	  normal	  in	  the	  era	  of	  communal	  system.	  To	  conclude,	  by	  studying	  the	  village	  leaders’	   interactions	   toward	   consistent	   public	   policies,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   village	  elections	   can	   effectively	   prompt	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   goods	   and	   services	   in	  villages.	   	  	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  contentious	  policies,	  before	  initiating	  village	  elections,	  these	  unpopular	   were	   enforced	   coercively	   by	   upper-­‐level	   government	   with	   no	   legal	  latitude	   for	   villagers	   to	   resist.	   In	   that	   situation,	   upper-­‐level	   authorities	   will	  achieve	   their	   best	   preference	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   loss	   of	   villagers.	   By	  introducing	   village	   elections,	   while	   the	   party	   secretary’s	   preference	   remains	  unchanged,	  the	  village	  chief	  shifts	  her	  accountability	  to	  represent	  villagers	  below	  rather	  than	  simply	  following	  the	  mandate	  above.	  Therefore,	  the	  interactions	  and	  the	  subsequent	  payoffs	  of	  party	  secretary	  and	  village	  chief	  have	  totally	  changed.	  Though	  both	  players	   still	  maintain	   rewards	   from	   their	  principals,	   they	  have	   to	  assume	  an	  extra	  transaction	  cost	  due	  to	  the	  policy	  divergence.	  Based	  on	  this	  logic,	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  initiating	  village	  elections	  will	  exacerbate	  rather	  than	  mitigate	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  enforcement	  of	  unpopular	  public	  policies	  in	  village.	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   Then,	   if	   we	   further	   compare	   the	   two	   different	   local	   governance	   patterns	  before	  and	  after	  initiating	  village	  elections,	  we	  may	  find	  the	  CCP	  faces	  a	  dilemma.	  The	   original	   purpose	   of	   this	   political	   experiment	   is	   to	   mitigate	   the	   severe	  cadre-­‐mass	  conflicts	  and	  to	  exert	  more	  effective	  monitor	  on	  local	  cadres	  in	  case	  of	   their	   corruptive	   activities	   and	   the	   subsequent	   agency	   lost	   for	   central	  government.	   Once	   putting	   village	   elections	   into	   effect,	   although	   the	   illegal	  rent-­‐seeking	   has	   been	   largely	   mitigated,	   and	   cadre-­‐mass	   relations	   are	   also	  ameliorated,	  some	  other	  problems	  came	  simultaneously.	  The	  conflicts	  have	  been	  transferred	   from	   former	   cadre-­‐mass	   relations	   to	   two-­‐committee	   relations	  between	  party	  secretary	  and	  village	  chief.	  Besides,	  village	  elections	  may	  result	  in	  those	  unpopular	  policies	  even	  harder	  to	  be	  enforced.	  
	   4.3	  The	  Supportive	  Evidences	  of	  the	  Models	  
	   Based	  on	  the	  models	  I	  developed	  above,	  we	  have	  come	  to	  two	  intermediate	  conclusions.	  That	  is	  after	  initiating	  the	  village	  elections:	  
(1) Regarding	  consistent	  public	  policies,	  village	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary	  will	  
both	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   willing	   to	   accept	   and	   enforce	   such	   policies	   than	  
before	   because	   the	   transfer	   of	  monitoring	   responsibility	   from	  upper-­‐level	  
authorities	   to	  villagers	  will	  exert	  more	  direct	  and	  effective	  supervision	  on	  
villager	  leaders’	  behavior;	  
(2) Regarding	  contentious	  public	  policies,	  village	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary	  will	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tend	   to	   possess	   different	   preferences	   as	   they	   are	   accountable	   to	   different	  
principals,	  which	  may	  result	  in	  the	  delay	  and	  dysfunction	  of	  such	  policies	  in	  
village.	  To	   prove	   whether	   the	   initiation	   of	   village	   elections	   result	   in	   the	  transformation	   of	   the	   execution	   of	   certain	   local	   polices,	   advanced	   quantitative	  research	  will	  surely	  provide	  us	  more	  solid	  evidences.	  However,	  data	  collection,	  especially	   for	   the	   record	   of	   sensitive	   topics,	   is	   always	   a	   severe	   obstacle	   for	  conducting	  research	  in	  an	  authoritarian	  state	  such	  as	  China.	  Even	  if	  researchers	  have	   enough	   funds,	   personal	   ties	   with	   officials	   in	   charge	   is	   also	   a	   necessary	  prerequisite.	  That	  may	  largely	  explain	  why	  most	  of	  previous	  research	  works	  on	  Chinese	   village	   elections	   are	   case	   studies	   instead	   of	   statistical	   research	   with	  large	  samples.	  Unfortunately,	  I	  cannot	  collect	  enough	  data	  related	  to	  my	  research	  questions	  above	  at	  the	  present,	  but	  there	  do	  exist	  several	  previous	  quantitative	  studies	   working	   on	   the	   accountability	   problems	   of	   Chinese	   village	   elections,	  which	  may	  well	  prove	  my	  models	  above.	   	  The	  study	  I	  will	  describe	  in	  this	  paper	  was	  conduct	  by	  Shuna	  Wang	  and	  Yang	  Yao	  (2006).	  Their	  research	  mainly	  focuses	  on	  the	  impacts	  of	  village	  elections	  on	  the	  accountability	  of	  village	  committee,	  local	  fiscal	  sharing,	  and	  state	  taxation	  by	  collecting	  data	  from	  48	  villages	  in	  eight	  provinces	  for	  a	  time	  period	  from	  1986	  to	  2002.	   They	   found	   that	   village	   elections	   in	   China	   substantially	   increase	   local	  public	   expenditures,	   and	   reduce	   administrative	   costs	   and	   revenues	   handed	   to	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upper-­‐level	   authorities.	   Besides,	   they	   found	   no	   significant	   influence	   of	   village	  elections	   on	   the	   state	   taxation.	   Though	   they	   did	   not	   emphasize	   the	   different	  types	  of	  public	  polices,	  the	  dependent	  variables	  in	  their	  model	  basically	  include	  all	  parameters	  I	  discussed	  above.	   	   	   	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Village	  Elections’	  Impact	  on	  Local	  Public	  Policies	  
	  
Source:	  Wang,	  2006.	  	   From	   the	   table	   above,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   the	   dependent	   variable	   “share	   of	  public	   expenditures”,	   which	   represents	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   goods	   and	  services	  I	  discussed	  above,	  is	  increasing	  significantly	  after	  the	  initiation	  of	  village	  elections.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  dependent	  variable	  “share	  of	  income	  handed	  to	  township”,	   which	   largely	   represents	   the	   township’s	   illegal	   revenue	   levy	   from	  village	  I	  talked	  before,	  is	  significantly	  decreasing	  after	  the	  elections.	  Both	  of	  them	  prove	  my	  models.	   In	   terms	  of	   the	  dependent	   variable	   “share	  of	   administration	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cost”,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  agency	  cost	  I	  discussed	  above,	  the	  decreasing	  tendency	  of	  administrative	  cost	  also	  proves	   that	  village	  elections	  significantly	  ameliorate	  the	   local	   governance.	   As	   for	   the	   state	   taxation,	   unlike	   the	   unpopular	   policies	   I	  stated	  above,	  village	  chief	  has	   little	  discretion	  on	  the	  execution	  of	  such	  policies	  because	  the	  tax	  rate	  has	  already	  been	  tightly	  fixed.	  Besides,	  since	  the	  agricultural	  tax,	   which	   was	   main	   source	   of	   state	   tax,	   has	   been	   abolished	   in	   2006,	   the	   tax	  burden	  on	  villagers	  has	  been	  largely	  relieved.	  Thus,	  this	  variable	  can	  exert	  little	  influence	   on	   the	   local	   governance	   and	   interactions	   between	   village	   chief	   and	  party	  secretary.	   	  	   Another	   research	   work	   conducted	   by	   Martinez-­‐Bravo	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   also	  proved	   my	   models.	   Their	   study	   used	   the	   village-­‐level	   data	   from	   217	   villages	  selected	  from	  25	  provinces	  for	  the	  time	  period	  from	  1980	  to	  2005.	  Though	  this	  study	  did	  not	  directly	  point	  to	  the	  two-­‐committee	  conflicts,	  we	  can	  still	  infer	  this	  conflict	  from	  their	  statistical	  results.	  First,	  by	  introducing	  a	  survey	  in	  the	  sample	  villages,	   they	   found	   that	   village	   elections	   have	   significantly	   increased	   the	  unilateral	  power	  of	  village	  chief	  and	  simultaneously	  decreased	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	   party	   secretary.	   Then,	   researchers	   of	   this	   study	   further	   probed	   into	   the	  village	   chief’s	   behavior	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   management	   of	   public	   policies	   in	  villages.	   They	   categorized	   public	   policies	   by	   two	   parameters,	   namely	   whether	  certain	   policy	   is	   popular	   and	  whether	   village	   chief	   has	   discretion	   over	   certain	  policy.	   Using	   the	   data	   collected	   from	   these	   sample	   villages,	   they	   found	   that	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regarding	  unpopular	  policies	  that	  village	  chiefs	  have	  decisive	  power,	  they	  tend	  to	  fulfill	   these	  policies	  based	  on	  villagers’	   rather	   than	   the	  upper-­‐level	   authorities’	  preferences,	  which	  prove	  my	  second	  model	  that	  when	  dealing	  with	  contentious	  policies,	   the	   village	   chief	   tends	   to	   reject	   them.	   In	   terms	  of	   the	  popular	  policies	  that	  village	  chiefs	  have	  discretion,	  they	  maintained	  that	  village	  leaders	  also	  tend	  to	  make	  decisions	  in	  accordance	  with	  villagers’	  preference,	  which	  proves	  my	  first	  model	  above	  that	  village	  elections	  help	   intensify	   the	  monitor	  on	  village	   leaders	  and	   reduce	   agency	   costs.	   Besides,	   this	   study	   also	   introduced	   a	   third	   placebo	  group	   to	   test	   village	   chiefs’	   behavior	   on	   policies	   that	   they	   have	   no	   discretion,	  whether	  the	  policies	  are	  popular	  or	  not,	  and	  they	  found	  that	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  change	  of	  policy	  preferences,	  proving	  that	  village	  chiefs	  can	  only	  exert	  influence	  on	  policies	  they	  have	  discretional	  power.	  	   Apart	  from	  the	  quantitative	  studies	  above,	  there	  are	  also	  some	  case	  studies	  directly	   discussing	   the	   two-­‐committee	   conflicts.	   Guo	   and	   Bernstein	   (2004)	  discussed	   a	   case	   happened	   in	   Da’ao	   Village	   of	   Guangdong	   Province.	   The	   party	  secretary	   in	   this	   village	   sold	   a	   great	   amount	   of	   collectively	   owned	   land	   to	   the	  local	   private	   enterprises	   and	   embezzled	   the	  money	   earned	   from	   the	   land	   sale.	  Dissatisfied	   by	   the	   party	   secretary’s	   corruptive	   activity,	   villagers,	   led	   by	   the	  village	   chief,	   urged	   the	   party	   secretary	   to	   submit	   the	   account	   book	   for	   check.	  However,	   the	   party	   secretary	   adamantly	   refused	   villagers’	   demand	   in	   case	   his	  corruption	   was	   exposed.	   Finally,	   the	   village	   chief	   lodged	   complaint	   to	   the	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upper-­‐level	   authorities	   to	   furiously	   expose	   the	   malfeasance	   of	   local	   party	  secretary.	  Pressed	  by	  local	  villagers’	  dissatisfaction,	  the	  upper-­‐level	  party	  branch	  deprived	  the	  party	  secretary’s	  position	  and	  charged	  him	  for	  his	  embezzlement.	   	  	   Another	  case	  study	  was	  conducted	  by	  Li	  (2002)	  in	  Dongcun	  Village	  of	  Hunan	  Province.	  In	  this	  case,	  after	  the	  villagers	  realized	  that	  the	  township	  government	  levied	   an	   excessive	   fee	   related	   to	   children’s	   education,	   which	   was	   essentially	  against	  the	  Regulation	  Concerning	  Peasants’	  Fees	  and	  Labor	  that	  designed	  by	  the	  State	   Council,	   they	   lodged	   a	   collective	   complaint	   to	   the	   township	   government	  under	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   village	   chief.	   Without	   an	   acceptable	   answer	   from	  township	  leaders,	  the	  peaceful	  complaint	  soon	  became	  a	  violent	  protest.	  During	  the	  whole	  protest,	  the	  party	  secretary	  in	  Dongcun	  Village	  remained	  silent	  in	  his	  own	  home.	  This	  protest	  soon	  spread	  to	  another	  six	  villages	  located	  in	  the	  same	  county	  and	  finally	  drew	  the	  attention	  of	  provincial	   leaders.	  After	   the	  provincial	  government	  sent	  a	  special	  research	  team	  to	  the	  township,	  they	  quickly	  cancelled	  the	  illegal	  revenue	  extraction	  and	  dismissed	  the	  township	  governors.	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Chapter	  Five:	  The	  Case	  Study,	  Qingxian	  Model	  
After	  discussing	  the	  interactions	  between	  village	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary,	  it	  is	   not	   hard	   to	   find	   that	   the	   power-­‐sharing	   puzzle	   may	   cause	   great	   conflict	  between	   these	   two	  organizations,	  especially	  when	   they	   face	  unpopular	  policies	  mandated	   from	   above.	   Their	   conflict	   may	   cause	   the	   delay	   of	   the	   execution	   of	  certain	   policies,	   which	   may	   result	   in	   great	   negative	   effects	   on	   the	   local	  governance.	  For	  example,	   if	  villagers	  are	  unsatisfied	  with	   the	   local	  governance,	  they	   can	   lodge	   complaints	   to	   higher-­‐level	   authorities,	   which	   may	   lead	   to	  instability	   in	   local	   areas.	   (Li	   &	   O’Brien	   1996,	   Li	   2002).	   Then	   here	   comes	   my	  second	  research	  question	  in	  this	  paper,	  which	  is	  how	  to	  solve	  the	  power-­‐sharing	  conflict	  in	  Chinese	  local	  areas?	  In	   fact,	   some	   institutional	   designers	   and	   academic	   scholars	   have	   already	  perceived	   this	   conflict	   and	   were	   engaged	   in	   some	   innovations	   to	   solve	   this	  problem.	   For	   example,	   in	   Guangdong	   Province,	   local	   CCP	   secretaries	   were	  required	  to	  run	  for	  the	  village	  chief	  in	  order	  to	  merge	  the	  personnel	  of	  these	  two	  committees	   and	   retake	   the	   village	   committee	   under	   CCP’s	   control.	   Besides,	   in	  Shanxi	   Province,	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   improving	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   party	  secretary	   in	   the	  rural	  area,	  a	   two-­‐ballot	  system	  was	   introduced.	   In	   this	  system,	  the	  upper-­‐level	  party	  committee	  first	  selects	  some	  candidates	  eligible	  to	  run	  for	  the	  party	  secretary	   in	  a	  village.	  Then	   the	  villagers	   rule	  out	   the	  candidates	   they	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don’t	  like	  by	  election	  at	  the	  first	  run.	  After	  that,	  party	  members	  will	  then	  elect	  the	  secretary	  among	  the	  rest	  candidates	  at	  the	  second	  run.	  (Li,	  1999)	   	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  is	  another	  example	  to	  solve	  the	  power-­‐sharing	  problem.	  In	  September	   2002,	   leaders	   in	   Qing	   County	   of	   Hebei	   Province	   started	   to	   conduct	  this	  new	  experiment	  in	  selected	  23	  villages.	  Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  2003,	  the	  new	  institution	  has	  been	  established	  around	  the	  county.	  Up	  to	  now,	  all	  345	  villages	  of	  the	   county	   have	   established	   Village	   Representative	   Assembly	   (VRA)	   and	   there	  are	  6325	  representatives	  in	  total.	   	  
5.1	  The	  Basic	  Content	  and	  Mechanism	  of	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  
According	  to	  the	  official	  record,	  the	  standard	  definition	  of	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  is	   a	  new	  mechanism	  of	   self-­‐autonomy	   in	  a	   rural	   area	  organized	  and	   led	  by	   the	  CCP.	   In	   this	   mechanism,	   the	   main	   specialty	   is	   to	   resurrect	   villagers	  representative	   assembly	   as	   a	   permanent	   political	   organization,	   and	   the	   power	  demarcation	   is	   that	   party	   branch	   possesses	   the	   top	   leadership,	   villagers	  representative	  assembly	  makes	  the	  decision,	  while	  village	  committee	  execute	  the	  concrete	  policy.	  (The	  Official	  Records	  of	  Qing	  County’s	  Villages,	  2009).	  In	   this	  model,	   the	   resurrection	   of	   VRA	   is	   the	  main	   focus,	   but	   actually,	   the	  assembly	   is	   not	   innovative	   at	   all.	   According	   to	   the	   Organic	   Law	   of	   Village	  Committee,	  the	  villagers	  assembly	  (VA)	  is	  the	  top	  decision	  maker,	  and	  for	  those	  large	   administrative	   villages	   where	   the	   population	   are	   distributed	   relatively	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dispersive,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   construct	   the	   VRA	   to	   execute	   the	   function	   of	  villagers	  assembly.	  The	  representative,	  who	  is	  normally	  recommended	  by	  every	  five	   to	   fifteen	  households,	   is	   responsible	   for	  discussing	  and	  deciding	   important	  issues	  related	  to	  village	  in	  regular	  representative	  meetings.	  (Article	  25)	   	  	   However,	  in	  reality,	   in	  most	  areas	  of	  Chinese	  villages,	  the	  VA	  and	  VRA	  have	  waned	  or	  even	  been	  suspended.	  In	  most	  areas,	  the	  VA	  and	  VRA	  meetings	  are	  only	  held	  no	  more	  than	  four	  times	  per	  year.	  (Oi	  &	  Rozelle,	  2000)	  Thus	  their	  functions	  cannot	   be	   fulfilled.	   This	   phenomenon	   is	   largely	   due	   to	   the	  weak	   awareness	   of	  political	   conceptions	   of	   general	   villagers.	   Achieving	   their	   own	   land	   through	  China’s	  economic	  reform,	  what	  villagers	  mostly	  concerned	  is	  their	  own	  economic	  status.	   In	   terms	  of	   the	  political	  power,	   they	  think	   it	  either	  belongs	  to	   the	  VC	  or	  belongs	  to	  the	  secretary,	  but	  not	  themselves.	  	   Leaders	   in	   Qing	   County	   perceived	   the	   dysfunction	   of	   VA	   and	   VRA.	   After	  applying	   the	   “Qingxian	   Model”,	   a	   detailed	   decision-­‐making	   process	   on	   certain	  issues	  in	  each	  village	  becomes	  more	  complicated,	  at	  least	  nominally.	  In	  the	  first	  stage,	  a	  draft	   resolution	   is	  put	   forward	  by	  one	  of	   the	   following	  units:	   the	  party	  branch,	  the	  village	  committee,	  1/10	  of	  all	  villagers,	  or	  1/3	  of	  all	  representatives.	  After	   that,	   the	   party	   branch	   would	   examine	   the	   draft	   resolution	   and	   have	  preliminary	   comments	   on	   it.	   Then	   the	   joint	  meeting	   attended	   by	   all	  members	  from	  both	  party	  branch	  and	  village	  committee	  would	  be	  held	  to	  set	   the	  agenda	  for	  a	  subsequent	  discussion.	  Next	  the	  joint	  meeting	  attended	  by	  all	  members	  of	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the	  party	  and	  of	  the	  two	  committees	  would	  scrutinize	  the	  draft.	  Then	  comes	  the	  most	   important	  part.	  The	  draft	  would	  be	  discussed	  and	  be	  voted	  in	  VRA	  where	  representatives	   have	   to	   affix	   their	   own	   stamps	   to	   assume	   the	   responsibility	   of	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  content	  of	  the	  resolution	  would	  be	  publicized	  in	  the	  village,	  and	  would	  be	  executed	  by	  village	  committee	  who	  has	  the	  responsibility	  to	  report	  the	  result	  of	  execution	  to	  party	  branch,	  the	  representative	  conference,	  and	  finally,	  common	  villagers.	  	   The	   “Qingxian	   Model”	   soon	   drew	   Chinese	   scholars’	   attention	   and	   positive	  response	  after	   its	   initiation.	  For	  example,	  Xu	  Fuqun	   insists	   that	   this	  model	   is	   a	  hopeful	   approach	   for	   the	   solution	   to	   the	   conflict	   of	   the	   two	   committees.	   Cao	  Guoying	   concludes	   that	   “Qing	  Model”	   is	   an	   ideal	   choice	   in	   the	   consideration	  of	  limitations	   in	  reality.	  Wen	  Tiejun	  Points	  out	  that	  this	  model	  would	  not	  cost	  too	  much	   for	  reformation	  and	  therefore	   it	   is	  effective.	  Li	  Qiang	  also	   thinks	   that	   the	  model	   is	  both	  progressive	  and	  conservative	  and	  has	   taken	  the	  consideration	  of	  short	  term	  as	  well	  as	  long	  term	  objectives.	  Yu	  Jianrong	  himself	  speaks	  highly	  of	  this	  pattern,	  saying	  that	  the	  secretary	  of	  Qing	  County	  is	  so	  wise	  that	  he	  not	  only	  brings	  out	  solution	   to	   the	  paradox	   in	   the	  governance	  of	  village,	  but	  also	  brings	  out	  solution	  to	  problems	  that	  have	  a	  decisive	  effect	  on	  the	  vitality	  of	  CCP.	  (The	  Official	  Records	  of	  Qing	  County’s	  Villages,	  2009)	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   5.2	  The	  Case	  Study	  in	  Gengguantun	  Village	  
	   In	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  Qing	  County	  in	  practice,	  I	  developed	  a	  field	  study	  in	  Gengguantun	  Village	  of	  Qing	  County	  in	  July	  2010,	  together	  with	  my	   three	   undergraduate	   classmates.	   During	   these	   eight-­‐day	   field	   work,	   we	  audited	   the	   whole	   process	   of	   VRA	   meeting	   as	   observers,	   held	   a	   number	   of	  interviews	   with	   the	   secretary	   of	   the	   party	   branch,	   Pan	   Bingzhong,	   as	   well	   as	  other	  relevant	  officials	  in	  the	  village,	  and	  had	  conversations	  with	  representatives	  of	   villagers	   and	  party	  members.	  Meanwhile	  we	  were	   also	   interviewing	   general	  villagers	   in	   Gengguantun	   Village	   in	   order	   to	   learn	   more	   about	   their	   opinions	  concerned	  about	  the	  practice	  of	  “Qing	  Model”,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  village,	  the	  conflicts	  between	  the	  two	  committees.	  
	   5.2.1.	  Background	  of	  Gengguantun	  Village	  
	   Gengguantun	  Village	  is	  located	  in	  Qing	  County	  of	  Hebei	  Province.	  It	  is	  0.5	  km	  far	   from	   the	   downtown	  of	  Qing	   County	   and	   close	   to	  No.104	  National	  Highway	  that	  provides	   the	  village	  with	  convenient	   transportation.	   It	   is	  also	  not	   far	   from	  Beijing,	   the	   capital	   of	   China,	   with	   only	   three	   hours’	   driving	   distance.	   The	  geographical	   advantages	   have	   provided	   favorable	   conditions	   to	   the	   economic	  development	  of	  the	  village.	  Besides,	  the	  village	  is	  in	  the	  east	  of	  Mid-­‐Hebei	  Plain	  where	  there	  are	  few	  mountains	  or	  hills.	  Climate	  conditions	  are	  also	  favorable.	  In	  2007,	   the	   gross	   industrial	   output	   value	   is	  35	  million	  dollar,	   the	   yearly	   average	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net	  income	  of	  villagers	  is	  2000	  dollar.	  It	  has	  become	  famous	  for	  prosperity	  and	  civilization	   among	   nearby	   areas.	   In	   2005,	   the	   village	   built	   the	   first	   large-­‐scale	  straw	  gasification	  station	  that	  was	  able	  to	  provide	  enough	  energy	  for	  cooking	  for	  the	  whole	   village.	  Many	   projects	   in	   the	   village	   have	   also	  won	   various	   rewards	  from	  upper-­‐level	  authorities.	  	   The	  secretary	  of	  party	  branch	  is	  Pan	  Bingzhong,	  who	  started	  to	  assume	  the	  position	   in	  1994.	  He	  gave	  others	  an	   impression	  of	  efficiency	  and	  resolution.	  At	  the	   end	   of	   1980s	   and	   the	   beginning	   of	   1990s,	   the	   collective	   economy	   of	   the	  village	  was	  close	  to	  collapse	  because	  of	  a	  series	  of	  negative	  factors.	  At	  that	  time,	  Pan,	  who	  was	  a	  successful	  private	  entrepreneur	  then	  started	  to	  come	  into	  power	  and	   saved	   the	   collective	   economy	   through	   attracting	   investment	   and	   building	  factories.	   Though	   Pan	   had	   been	   emphasizing	   his	   selflessness	   during	   the	  interview,	   we	   found	   the	   opposite	   opinion	   when	   having	   conversations	   with	  general	  villagers.	  According	  to	  their	  description,	  Pan	  assumed	  the	  party	  branch	  position	  without	   giving	   up	   all	   his	   business,	   but	   instead	   remain	   to	   be	   the	  main	  shareholder	   of	   his	   enterprises.	   They	   believe	   many	   projects	   in	   the	   village	   are	  associated	  with	  Pan’s	  business	   in	  a	  way	  after	  his	  came	  into	  power,	   in	  which	  he	  embezzled	  enormous	  illegal	  profits.	  Besides,	  villagers	  complained	  that	  Pan’s	  life	  is	  quite	  luxurious.	   	  	   In	   terms	   of	   the	   two-­‐committee	   conflict,	   according	   to	   the	   official	   record	   of	  Qing	   County,	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	   elected	   village	   chief	   and	   the	   party	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secretary	   was	   widespread	   across	   the	   whole	   county	   before	   initiating	   the	  “Qingxian	  Model”.	   In	  Gengguantun	  Village,	   the	  conflict	  was	  mainly	  between	   the	  party	   secretary,	   Mr.	   Pan,	   and	   the	   former	   village	   chief,	   Mr.	   Liu.	   As	   I	   described	  above,	  Pan	  collected	  great	  amount	  of	  money	  by	  selling	  collectively	  owned	   land	  and	  by	  embezzling	  public	  resources	  through	  his	  private	  enterprise.	  However,	  the	  former	   village	   chief	   Mr.	   Liu	   was	   just	   a	   general	   farmer	   who	   made	   a	   living	   by	  cultivating	  his	  own	  land.	  He	  was	  elected	  because	  of	  his	  righteous,	  laborious,	  and	  amiable	  characters.	  As	  Liu	  preferred	  to	  protect	  the	  arable	  land	  from	  the	  modern	  use,	  he	  was	  extremely	  against	  Pan’s	   idea	  of	  selling	  collective	   land.	  According	  to	  the	   villagers	   in	   Gengguantun	   Village,	   these	   two	   village	   leaders	   were	   seldom	  talking	  to	  each	  other.	  When	  participating	  village	  meetings,	  they	  often	  sat	  far	  from	  each	   other.	   When	   one	   of	   them	   launched	   a	   speech,	   the	   other	   would	   express	  nothing	  but	  indifference	  and	  disdain.	  	   Liu	   also	   tried	   to	   lodge	   complaint	   to	   the	   upper-­‐level	   government,	   but	  achieved	   nothing	   as	   Pan’s	   personal	   ties,	   constructed	   and	   intensified	   through	  countless	  and	  ceaseless	  briberies,	  were	  much	  stronger	  than	  his.	  Finally,	  Liu	  had	  to	  quit	  the	  position.	  	   After	   Liu’s	   resignation,	   some	   villagers	   also	   expressed	   their	   dissatisfactions	  towards	  Pan’s	  malfeasance,	  but	  suffered	  grave	  consequences.	  Some	  villagers	  told	  me	  during	  secret	   interviews	  that	  once	  a	  villager	  burned	  Pan’s	  brand-­‐new	  BMW	  car	   because	   Pan	   forcefully	   removed	   his	   home	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   new	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apartments.	  After	  knowing	  the	  truth,	  Pan	  first	  hired	  some	  members	  of	  criminal	  syndicate	   to	  break	  one	   leg	  of	   this	  villager,	   and	   then	  accused	   the	  villager	   in	   the	  upper-­‐level	   court	   for	   intentionally	   damaging	   his	   private	   goods.	   Finally,	   the	  villager	  was	  put	  in	  jail.	  Soon	  after	  that,	  Pan	  bought	  a	  new	  BMW	  car	  same	  to	  the	  former	  one.	   	  
	   5.2.2.	  The	  Application	  of	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  in	  Gengguantun	  Village	  
	   As	   the	   “pilot	   village”	   in	  Qing	  County,	   Gengguantun	  Village	   started	   to	   apply	  the	   “Qingxian	   Model”	   as	   early	   as	   its	   initiation.	   Though	   in	   many	   official	  conferences,	   Zhao	   Chaoying,	   the	   party	   secretary	   of	   Qing	   County	   and	   also	   the	  designer	  of	  “Qing	  Model”,	  has	  emphasized	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  the	  resurrection	  of	  VRA	  on	  the	  removal	  of	  power-­‐sharing	  conflict	  between	  village	  chief	  and	  party	  secretary,	   realities	   are	  much	   complicated.	  We	   noticed	   some	   phenomenon	   that	  both	  officials	  and	  scholars	  seldom	  pay	  attention	  to.	  	   First,	  the	  practice	  of	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  indicates	  that	  the	  resurrection	  of	  VRA	  can	  effectively	  mitigate	   the	   two-­‐committee	   conflict,	  but	   it	   also	   leads	   the	  power	  skewing	   lopsided	   to	   the	   party	   branch.	   During	   our	   interviews	   with	   common	  villagers,	  they	  all	  claim	  that	  there	  exists	  no	  conflict	  between	  the	  two	  committees	  and	   their	   heads.	   The	   leadership	   of	   the	   party	   branch	   on	   village	   committee	   is	  strong.	   The	   village	   chief	   in	   Gengguantun	  Village,	   Qi,	   also	   spoke	   highly	   of	   Pan’s	  role	  and	  ability	  in	  the	  interview.	  He	  said,	  “Without	  Secretary	  Pan	  there	  would	  not	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have	  today’s	  Gengguantun	  Village.	  It’s	  just	  his	  personal	  capability.”	  	   However,	   the	   party	   branch	   and	   the	   secretary	   also	   become	   too	   powerful	  accompanied	   with	   the	   strengthening	   of	   party’s	   leadership	   as	   well	   as	   the	  eliminating	   of	   the	   conflict.	   Firstly,	   the	   representative	   committee	   can	   not	  implement	  any	  effective	  oversight	  of	  the	  party	  branch.	  The	  15th,	  July	  2010	  is	  the	  Political	  Discussion	  Day	  for	  all	  villages	  in	  Qing	  County	  when	  the	  president	  of	  VRA	  (it	   is	   Pan	   actually	   run	   as	   a	   concurrent	   post),	   representatives,	   members	   of	   the	  party	   branch,	   all	   officials	   of	   the	   village	   committee	   participated	   in	   discussions.	  There	  were	  six	  sections	  in	  total	  including	  first	  half	  year’	  report	  on	  work,	  first	  half	  year’s	   report	   on	   finance,	   second	   half	   years’	   planning,	   democratic	   appraisal	  through	  democratic	  discussions,	  the	  speeches	  made	  by	  the	  township	  official,	  and	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  discussions	  made	  by	  the	  party	  secretary.	  When	  it	  was	  the	  turn	   of	   representatives	   to	   comment,	   some	   of	   them	   highly	   praised	   the	  work	   of	  leaders	  in	  the	  village,	  some	  of	  them	  emphasized	  that	  they	  could	  have	  democratic	  rights	  only	  because	  of	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  party	  secretary.	  Some	  of	  them	  even	  cited	   Chairman	   Mao’s	   poems	   to	   speak	   highly	   of	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   party.	  Obviously,	  they	  said	  nothing	  substantive	  except	  flattery.	  After	  the	  discussion,	  the	  representatives	  and	  party	  members	  voted	  for	  the	  policy	  resolutions	  and	  signed	  their	   names.	   All	   decisions	   won	   a	   unanimous	   vote.	   In	   fact,	   according	   to	  representatives	   and	   village	   officials,	   since	   the	   establishment	   of	   VRA,	   all	  resolutions	  won	  a	  unanimous	  vote.	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   Secondly,	   the	   VRA	   and	   its	   representatives	   not	   only	   fail	   to	   implement	   any	  oversight	  of	  the	  party	  branch	  and	  its	  party	  secretary,	  Pan	  also	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  conference	  as	  a	  way	  to	  strengthen	  his	  power	  and	  influence	  in	  pursuit	  of	  his	  own	  interests.	  Here	  is	  an	  interview	  between	  a	  representative	  and	  us.	  	   …	  Interviewer:	  How’s	  the	  frequency	  of	  the	  meeting	  of	  villagers	  assembly?	  Representative:	   It’s	   too	   frequent.	  We	  usually	  have	  meetings	   at	   night	  which	   last	   for	  1	  or	  2	  hours.	   	  
…	  Interviewer:	  What	  do	  you	  often	  do	  during	  the	  meeting?	  Representative:	  Villagers	  can	  have	  discussions	  with	  our	  representatives	  to	  find	  out	  solutions	  to	  some	  problems.	  Interviewer:	  Does	  the	  smaller	  neighboring	  village	  also	  have	  such	  meetings?	  Representative:	   Other	   villages	   never	   have	   meetings,	   if	   nothing	   happens.	   Gengguantun	  Village	   is	   just	  a	  model,	  and	   is	   the	  only	  model.	  Frankly	  speaking,	  what	  you	  have	   just	  seen	   is	   the	  most	  positive	  and	  brightest	  side	  of	  the	  village	  and	  you	  can	  only	  see	  this	  side.	  
…	  	   Interviewer:	  Have	  there	  ever	  been	  big	  problems.	  Representative:	  No,	  and	  we	  can	  solute	  small	  problems	  through	  negotiations.	  Based	  on	   their	  words,	  when	  encountering	  some	  tough	  problems	  that	  party	  secretary	  can	  hardly	  solve	  through	  direct	  demand,	  people	  will	  seek	  the	  help	  with	  some	   informal	   institutions,	   such	   negotiations	   in	   clan’s	   meetings	   or	   religious	  groups,	  rather	  than	  VA	  and	  VRA.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  VRA	  is	  just	  a	  form	  without	  any	  substance.	  Moreover,	  based	  on	  our	  field	  study,	  the	  VRA	  in	  Gengguantun	  Village	  has	  not	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become	   the	   channel	   and	   platform	   for	   villagers	   to	   participate	   and	   discuss	   local	  politics.	   Villagers	   are	   unclear	   of	   the	   selection	   process	   of	   villagers’	  representatives	  at	  all.	   	  Interviewer:	  Do	  you	  know	  anything	  about	  villagers’	  representative?	  Villager	  A:	  I	  am	  not	  one	  of	  them,	  and	  they	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  party	  secretary.	  Interview:	  They	  tell	  us	  they	  are	  elected.	  Villager	  A:	  They	   just	   tell	  you	   the	  good	   things.	   In	   fact	   it’s	   just	   like	  your	  school.	  The	   teacher	  will	   only	   appoint	   those	  who	  have	  good	   relation	  with	  him	  or	  her	   as	   class	   leaders.	   It’s	   the	   same	  here.	   If	   you	   don’t	   have	   good	   relation	   with	   the	   production	   team,	   you	   are	   not	   allowed	   to	   be	   a	  representative.	  Interviewer:	  Are	  there	  any	  benefits	  of	  being	  representative?	  Villager	  A:	  You	  can	  get	  paid.	  
…	  Interviewer:	  What	  kind	  of	  people	  can	  be	  representatives?	  Villager	  A:	  What	  kind	  of	  people?	  Flatterers	  can!	  You	  can	  tell	  that	  from	  their	  speeches.	  They	  never	  tell	  you	  the	  truth	  and	  in	  villagers’	  eyes	  they	  are	  just	  the	  minion.	  Interviewer:	  But	  they	  are	  quite	  old,	  aren’t	  they?	  Villager	  A:	  Sure.	  At	  their	  ages,	  they	  can	  just	  get	  some	  money	  by	  flattering.	  You	  only	  need	  to	  flatter,	  then	  you	  get	  paid.	  Why	  do	  they	  only	  say	  something	  good?	  If	  they	  say	  something	  bad,	  they	  can	  get	  no	  money.	  
…	  Interviewer:	  Have	  you	  ever	  voted	  for	  representatives?	  Villager	  B:	  Yes,	   I	  have.	  And	  every	   time	  candidates	  are	   the	   same.	  They	  are	   those	  who	  have	  prestige	  and	  whose	  words	  matter.	  
…	  Interviewer:	  Have	  you	  ever	  participated	  in	  the	  election?	  Villager	  C:	  Yes.	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Interviewer:	  Whom	  did	  you	  vote	  for?	  Villager	  C:	  Those	  old	  people.	  Those	  who	  are	  now	  representatives	  will	  continue	  to	  be.	  We	  are	  too	  young	  to	  understand	  these	  affairs.	  We	  can	   tell	   that	  villagers	  are	  not	  very	  keen	  on	   the	  election,	  partly	  because	  some	  of	  them	  have	  no	  idea	  on	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  the	  village.	  More	  importantly,	  many	   villagers	   believe	   that	   the	   party	   secretary	   have	   intervened	   the	   elections.	  This	  strongly	  affects	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  elections.	  Besides,	  we	  also	  find	  out	  that	  representatives	  seldom	  have	  essential	  contact	  with	   common	   villagers,	   who	   also	   seldom	   call	   on	   representatives	   when	   facing	  problems.	  These	  records	  can	  reflect	  the	  situation	  very	  well.	  
…	  Interviewer:	  Have	  you	  had	  any	  contacts	  with	  representatives?	  Villager	  D:	  No.	  Interviewer:	  Who	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  informing	  if	  there	  are	  some	  events?	  Villager	  D:	  Not	  representatives.	  The	  village	  committee	  will	  send	  their	  men	  to	  each	  house.	  
…	  Interviewer:	  How	  do	  you	  think	  of	  the	  development	  in	  the	  village?	  Villager	   D:	   It’s	   very	   good.	   But	   we	   have	   no	   contacts	   with	   the	   village	   committee,	   and	   we	  cannot	  understand	  many	  policies.	  Many.	  Interviewer:	  If	  you	  are	  not	  satisfied,	  how	  can	  you	  deal	  with	  it?	  Villager	  D:	  If	  we	  are	  not	  satisfied,	  we	  can	  only	  be	  unsatisfied	  at	  home.	  No	  one	  would	  reflect	  the	  situation	  to	  higher	  rank	  and	  it	  is	  useless	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  other	  villagers	  there	  may	  be	  such	  actions,	  but	  not	  here	  at	  Gengguantun.	  We	   just	   follow	  the	  mainstream	  and	  do	  our	  own	  business	  quietly.	  We	  don’t	  want	  to	  stir	  up	  trouble,	  and	  we	  don’t	  care	  much	  about	  matters	  concerned	  about	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  either.	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Besides,	  as	  far	  as	  we	  know,	  several	  years	  ago,	  some	  unsatisfied	  villagers	  did	  lodge	  complaints	  to	  higher-­‐level	  authorities	  to	  complain	  about	  Pan’s	  malfeasance,	  but	  came	  back	  with	  no	  good	  news.	   Instead,	  Pan	   threatened	   the	  villagers	   that	   if	  the	   “troublemakers”	   did	   not	   lodge	   complaint	   successfully,	   he	   would	   make	  reprisals	  on	  them	  one	  by	  one.	  In	   conclusion,	   the	   resurrection	   of	   VRA	   in	   Gengguantun	   Village	   did	   help	  mitigate	   the	   two-­‐committee	   conflict,	   but	   it	   also	   adds	  more	   power	   to	   the	   party	  secretary	   improperly.	  No	   effective	  oversight	   from	   the	  VRA	  of	   the	  party	  branch	  exists.	   What’s	   more,	   the	   experience	   and	   practice	   in	   Gengguantun	   Village	   also	  suggest	   that	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   VRA	   does	   not	   provide	   any	   platform	   or	  channel	   for	   villagers	   to	   participate	   in	   politics,	   as	   it	   is	   originally	   expected.	   The	  conflict	  between	  masses	  and	  cadres	  continue,	  while	  the	  harmony	  in	  the	  village	  is	  still	  far	  away.	  Then	  what	  goes	  wrong	  inside	  the	  “Qingxian	  Model”?	  
5.3.	  The	  Analysis	  of	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  
Different	   from	   other	   solutions,	   the	   institutional	   designers	   of	   Qing	   County	  mainly	  focus	  on	  the	  resurrection	  of	  the	  VRA.	  By	  setting	  the	  VRA	  as	  the	  hub	  of	  the	  model,	   the	  power-­‐sharing	  puzzle	  between	  village	   chief	   and	  party	   secretary	  are	  largely	   solved.	   According	   to	   the	  Organic	   Law	   of	   Village	   Committee,	   the	   VRA	   is	  defined	  as	  the	  representative	  institution	  of	  the	  VA.	  While	  under	  the	  regulations	  of	   Qing	   County,	   the	   VRA	   is	   raised	   as	   a	   standing	   body	   whose	   missions	   are	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discussing,	   policy-­‐making	   and	   supervising	   through	   the	   meetings	   held	   once	   a	  month.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  transformed	  into	  a	  real	  power	  from	  a	  nominal	  institution.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   designers	   of	   “Qingxian	   Model”	   created	   a	   new	   position	  called	   the	   president	   of	   the	   VRA	   and	   strongly	   encourage	   the	   party	   secretary	   in	  village	  to	  run	  for	  this	  position	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  CCP	  in	  local	  areas.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   village	   committee	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   new	   model	   is	  settled	  just	  as	  the	  executive	  administration	  of	  the	  VRA	  and	  the	  VA.	  Village	  chief	  in	  this	   sense	   must	   accept	   the	   legal	   leadership	   of	   these	   “democratic”	   institutions,	  which	  means	  to	  accept	  the	  leadership	  of	  CCP	  meanwhile.	  We	  can	  also	  perceive	  the	  genuine	  purpose	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  “Qingxian	  Model”	   through	  speeches	  of	   the	  designer,	  party	  secretary	  Zhao	  of	  Qing	  County.	  Zhao	  points	  out	  that	  the	  innovative	  part	  of	  Qing	  Xian	  Pattern	  is	  that	  the	  secretary	  of	  the	  party	  branch	  is	  recommended	  to	  assume	  the	  president	  of	  VRA,	  who	  have	  the	   right	   to	   convene	   and	  preside	   over	   the	   conference.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   those	  who	  could	  not	  successfully	  elected	  in	  the	  chairperson	  would	  also	  be	  required	  to	  resign	  the	  secretary	  position	  or	  be	  exempted	  by	  the	  party,	  so	  that	  the	  authority	  of	   the	   secretary	  of	   the	  party	  branch	  could	  be	  guaranteed	   in	   the	  village.	  During	  the	  process	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  secretary	  of	  the	  party	  branch,	  who	  is	  also	  the	  president	   of	   the	   VRA	   in	   reality,	  must	   do	   his	   job	   among	   representatives	   before	  they	   vote	   on	   any	   resolution	   that	   could	   direct	   the	   execution	   of	   the	   village	  committee.	   Besides,	   the	   party	   branch	   could	   also	   launch	   within	   the	   VRA	   an	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impeachment	   of	   the	   village	   chief	  who	   disobeys	   these	   resolutions.	   Zhao	   argues	  that	   it	   is	   in	   this	  way	   that	   the	   leadership	   exerted	   by	   the	   party	   over	   the	   village	  committee	   could	   be	   ensured,	   that	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	   two	   committees	   as	  well	  as	  conflict	  between	  masses	  and	  cadres	  could	  be	  eliminated	  essentially,	  that	  villagers	  could	  finally	  be	  provided	  a	  channel	  and	  a	  platform	  for	  the	  participation	  in	  political	  affairs.	  What’s	  more,	  Zhao	  is	  also	  optimistic	  on	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  the	   new	   pattern	   on	   the	   atmosphere	   of	   the	   party	   in	   grassroots	   as	   well	   as	   the	  village.	   According	   to	   the	   introductions	   of	   local	   officials,	   87%	  of	   the	   villages	   all	  over	   the	   Qing	   Xian	   County	   have	   secretaries	   of	   party	   branches	   who	   are	   also	  president	  of	  VRA	  at	   the	   same	   time.	  The	   representative	   conference	  has	  become	  the	  tool	  for	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  party	  in	  villages.	  Concretely	  speaking,	  the	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  reconstructs	  the	  power	  structure	  by	   a	   two-­‐level	   vertical	   power	   system.	   The	   first	   vertical	   power	   delineation	   is	  between	   the	   VRA	   and	   village	   committee.	   As	   the	   VRA	   possesses	   the	   authority	  endowed	  by	  the	  law,	  the	  VRA	  should	  be	  the	  top	  decision	  maker	  in	  the	  village.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  put	  the	  village	  committee	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  VRA.	  Thus	  the	  village	  committee	  should	  be	  accountable	  to	  the	  VRA,	  and	  the	  VRA	  can	  exert	  its	  de	  jure	  power	  to	  override	  the	  decision	  made	  by	  village	  committee.	  The	  second	   vertical	   power	   delineation	   is	   between	   the	   party	   branch	   and	   the	   VRA.	  Originally,	   there	   shouldn’t	   be	   a	   vertical	   system	   as	   their	   powers	   belong	   to	  different	   domains.	   The	   party	   branch’s	   power	   is	   authorized	   by	   the	   upper-­‐level	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party	   system,	   while	   the	   VRA’s	   power	   is	   authorized	   directly	   by	   the	   villagers.	  However,	  this	  model	  encourages	  the	  secretary	  of	  the	  village	  party	  branch	  to	  run	  for	   the	  presidency	  of	   the	  VRA;	   simultaneously,	   the	  party	  branch	   is	   required	   to	  enlarge	   party	   members	   among	   the	   VRA	   representatives.	   By	   these	   two	  measurements,	  the	  party	  branch	  successfully	  “steals”	  the	  de	  facto	  power	  of	  VRA.	  Thus	  through	  these	  two-­‐level	  institutional	  change,	  the	  party	  branch	  of	  the	  CCP	  in	  villages	  successfully	  rebuilds	  the	  political	  power	  in	  its	  own	  hands.	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Chapter	  Six:	  Conclusion	  
In	   this	   paper,	   I	   develop	   a	   pure	   strategic	  model	   to	   explain	   the	   interactions	  between	   Chinese	   village	   chief	   and	   party	   secretary	   after	   introducing	   popular	  village	   elections	   in	   1980s.	   Based	   on	   two	   different	   types	   of	   public	   policies,	  consistent	   policies	   and	   contentious	   policies,	   both	   players	  will	   choose	   different	  actions.	  When	  dealing	  with	  consistent	  policies,	  both	  players	  will	  choose	  to	  accept	  and	   enforce	   them.	  However,	  when	   discussing	   contentious	   policies,	  while	   party	  secretary	  will	   continue	   to	   stay	  with	   the	  mandate	   from	  above,	   village	   chief	  will	  choose	  to	  reject	  them	  and	  instead	  prefer	  to	  be	  accountable	  to	  villagers’	  interest,	  which	  will	   lead	   to	   the	   conflict	   between	   village	   chief	   and	   party	   secretary.	   After	  comparing	  the	  ex	  ante	  and	  ex	  post	  payoff,	  introducing	  villages	  elections	  will	  help	  state	  to	  exert	  more	  direct	  and	  effective	  monitor	  on	   local	  cadres	  by	  transferring	  this	  responsibility	  to	  villagers.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  however,	  village	  elections	  will	  not	   lead	   to	   better	   enforcement	   of	   unpopular	   policies	   in	   rural	   areas.	   Statistical	  evidences	  from	  previous	  research	  works	  prove	  the	  implications	  concluded	  from	  the	  models.	  Regarding	   the	   two-­‐committee	   conflict,	   there	   are	   two	   possible	   solutions	  theoretically.	  The	  first	  solution	  is	  to	  deprive	  party	  secretary’s	  discretion	  over	  the	  decision-­‐making	   process	   by	  weakening	   or	   even	   abolishing	   the	   party	   branch	   in	  villages,	   which	   makes	   unpopular	   public	   policies	   rejected	   directly	   by	   village	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committees.	  Following	  this	  path,	  Chinese	  central	  leaders	  may	  gradually	  open	  the	  popular	  elections	  to	  the	  upper-­‐level	  governments	  since	  no	  effective	  tools	  exist	  in	  rural	  areas	   to	  enforce	   the	  unpopular	  policies.	  Finally,	   this	  path	  may	   lead	  to	   the	  complete	  democratization	  of	  Mainland	  China.	   	  However,	  in	  the	  current	  situation,	  this	  alternative	  seems	  relatively	  infeasible	  because	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  will	  by	  no	  means	  voluntarily	  relinquishes	  its	  political	   power.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   other	   choice	   seems	   to	   be	  more	   acceptable	   by	  Chinese	  senior	  leaders.	  That	  is	  to	  weaken	  village	  chief’s	  discretion	  and	  resurrect	  party	   secretary’s	   control	   over	   local	   affairs.	   Several	   experiments	   have	   already	  been	   conducted	   in	   some	   provinces.	   In	   this	   paper,	   I	   mainly	   focus	   on	   the	  experiment	  conducted	  in	  Hebei	  Province	  with	  the	  name	  of	  “Qingxian	  Model”.	  In	  this	  model,	  the	  party	  branch	  finally	  recaptures	  the	  top	  power	  by	  resurrecting	  the	  villagers	   representative	   assembly	   (VRA)	   as	   a	   permanent	   political	   organization,	  and	  then	  requires	  the	  secretary	  of	  party	  branch	  to	  run	  for	  the	  president	  of	  VRA.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  CCP	  largely	  enlarges	  its	  membership	  among	  representatives	  of	  VRA	  to	  assure	  the	  majority	  advantage.	  Through	  this	  arrangement,	  party	  branch	  controlled	  the	  VRA	  and	  then	  further	  direct	  the	  village	  committee	  legally.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  application	  of	  “Qingxian	  Model”,	  while	  some	  scholars	  praise	  it	  as	   a	   good	   innovation	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   power	   structure	   and	   solve	   the	  power-­‐sharing	  problem	  between	  the	  party	  branch	  and	  village	  committee,	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  rather	  a	  reverse	  of	  China’s	  democratization.	  In	  fact,	  the	  original	  purpose	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of	  the	  self-­‐autonomy	  reform	  in	  rural	  China	  is	  to	  slightly	  relax	  the	  control	  of	  the	  CCP	  at	  the	  local	  level	  and	  let	  villagers	  decide	  their	  own	  business.	  But	  it	  still	  left	  a	  conservative	  “tail”	   in	  the	  Organic	  Law	  of	  Village	  Committee	  by	  alleging	  that	  the	  CCP	   still	   possesses	   the	  macro-­‐level	   leadership	   in	   a	   village,	  which	   obscured	   the	  power	  delineation	  and	   led	   to	   the	  conflict	  between	   the	  secretary	  and	   the	  VC.	   In	  this	   sense,	   the	   “Qingxian	   Model”	   essentially	   contradicts	   Chinese	   political	  democratization	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  What’s	  worse,	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  have	  already	  emerged	  in	  villages	  of	  Qing	  County.	  After	  a	  field	  work	  in	  2010	  in	  Qing	  County,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  application	  of	  “Qingxian	  Model”	  potentially	  cultivates	  the	  corruptive	  spoil	  for	  secretaries	  in	  local	  level	  as	  they	  regain	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  resources	  allocation.	  Besides,	   as	   the	  party	   branch	   firmly	   control	   the	  VRA,	   its	   resurrection	   soon	   lose	  the	  meaning	  but	  just	  serve	  as	  the	  tool	  for	  the	  secretary	  to	  acquire	  the	  legitimacy.	  During	  my	  interview	  of	  some	  general	  villages,	  they	  told	  me	  that	  representatives	  were	  already	  pre-­‐selected	  by	  party	  branch	  and	  voting	  was	  no	  more	   than	   just	  a	  form.	  They	  had	  neither	  the	  ability,	  nor	  the	  motivation	  to	  contain	  party	  secretarys.	  In	   this	   sense,	   “Qingxian	   Model”	   and	   other	   similar	   innovations	   may	   exert	  long-­‐term	  harm	  to	  China’s	  political	  reform	  and	  development	  in	  the	  long	  run.	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